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ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL  
INSURERS’ EXPECTATIONS: 
CAN STATES UNILATERALLY QUASH 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS 
UNDER THE MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT? 
 
Mary Pennisi*
“The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, 
any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved 
in favor of arbitration . . . .”
 
1
 
 
“The greater number of arbitration agreements that federal courts 
will, in all likelihood, be called upon to enforce, will fall within the 
scope of the state laws.”2
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Commercial parties worldwide rely on arbitration clauses to 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2011; B.A., Political Science, 
Philosophy of Law, and Economics, summa cum laude, Macaulay Honors College at 
Brooklyn College, City University of New York, 2008.  I would like to thank Professors 
John Feerick and Eric Tuchmann, General Counsel of the American Arbitration 
Association, for their guidance, input and expertise.  I would also like to thank Corey 
Worcester, Esq. for encouraging me to study arbitration and continue my academic 
research and writing during my last year of law school.  Furthermore, I remain grateful 
to my mentor Michael Grohman, Esq. for his ongoing support and inspiration to pursue 
my legal studies.  Finally, special thanks are due to the Editors and Staff of the 
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law for their hard work throughout the 
publication process and to my mother, Danny, and Doyle for their continuous 
encouragement, love, and infinite patience. 
 1. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 
(1983). 
 2. Harry Baum & Leon Pressman, The Enforcement of Commercial Arbitration 
Agreements in the Federal Courts, 8 N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 428, 445 (1931). 
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mitigate the high risks inherent in international business transactions.3  
A split in federal circuit courts has recently emerged and left the validity 
of arbitration agreements in insurance contracts under the United 
Nations Convention on the Recognition and the Enforcement of Arbitral 
Agreements (the “New York Convention” or the “Convention”) in a 
state of uncertainty.4  The New York Convention mandates that United 
States federal courts enforce arbitration agreements among international 
parties.5  Article II specifically requires signatories to “recognize an 
agreement in writing under which the parties undertake to submit to 
arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or which may arise 
between them . . . concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by 
arbitration.”6  In the context of insurance, however, numerous states 
have enacted statutes that render arbitration agreements unenforceable.7
 
 3. Geoffrey Robb & Kevin Canty, Dispute Resolution Developments: Selecting 
Law, Jurisdiction, and Arbitration in Marine Insurance Policies, 15 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 
325 (2003). 
  
 4. Compare Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 
587 F.3d 714 (5th Cir. 2009) with Stephens v. Am. Int’l Ins. Co., 66 F.3d 41 (2nd Cir. 
1995). 
 5. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 
(2002)) [hereinafter New York Convention]. 
 6. Id. at 1. 
 7. See Ark. Code Ann. 16-108-201(b) (arbitration agreements “shall have no 
application to . . . any insured or beneficiary under any insurance policy”); Ga. Code 
Ann. § 9-9-2(c)(3) (arbitration agreements “shall not apply” to “any contract of 
insurance”); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 5-401(c) (arbitration agreements “shall not apply to . . . 
[c]ontracts of insurance”); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 417.050(2) (noting that disputes under 
“insurance contracts” are not arbitrable); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 22:629a (“[n]o insurance 
contract . . . shall contain any . . . agreement . . . depriving the courts . . . of the 
jurisdiction of action against the insurer”); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 435.350 (excluding 
“contracts of insurance”); Mont. Code Ann. § 27-5-114(2)(c) (explaining that insurance 
contracts are not arbitrable); Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-2602(f)(4) (“enforcement of 
written contracts requiring parties to submit to arbitration does not apply to . . . any 
agreement . . . relating to an insurance policy other than a contract between insurance 
companies including a reinsurance contract”); Ok. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 802 (“shall not 
apply to . . . contracts with reference to insurance except for those contracts between 
insurance companies”); S.D. Codified Laws § 21-25A-3 (“does not apply to insurance 
policies”); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 5653 (“does not apply . . . to arbitration agreements 
contained in a contract of insurance”). See also MITCHELL F. DOLIN & CATHERINE E. 
LONG, 1 LAW AND PRAC. OF INS. COVERAGE LITIG. § 11:22 (2010) (“At least eleven 
states that have enacted laws providing generally for the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements specifically refuse to allow arbitration of insurance disputes.”). 
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They have accordingly invalidated international insurers’ arbitration 
agreements under the McCarran-Ferguson Act (“MFA” or the “Act”), 
which allows state law regulating the “business of insurance” to reverse-
preempt federal law.8  Under this statute, which Congress originally 
enacted in 1945 to preserve states’ rights to regulate the insurance 
industry and prevent federal prosecutors from targeting insurers’ 
practices under the federal antitrust laws, states have refused to enforce 
arbitration clauses in insurance contracts, despite the New York 
Convention.9
On November 9, 2009, Safety National Casualty Corp. v. Certain 
Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London created a split in federal circuit courts 
over whether the MFA reverse-preempts the New York Convention and 
allows states to circumvent the United States’ national policy favoring 
arbitration by invalidating global insurers’ arbitration agreements.
 
10  The 
Fifth Circuit11 and several district courts12
 
 8. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1012(b). Typically, under the Supremacy Clause, federal law 
preempts inconsistent state law. Munich Am. Reinsurance Co. v. Crawford, 141 F.3d 
585, 590 (5th Cir. 1998); U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. However, the McCarran-Ferfuson 
Act’s reverse-preemption provision enables state law regulating the insurance industry 
to supersede or “reverse-preempt” federal law. See Elizabeth K. Stanley, Parties’ 
Defenses to Binding Arbitration Agreements in The Health Care Field & The Operation 
of The McCarran-Ferguson Act, 38 St. Mary’s L.J. 591, 606 (2007). 
 have held that the MFA does 
not reverse-preempt any treaty and that the New York Convention 
therefore protects arbitration agreements in international insurance 
 9. See, e.g., Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 724-25. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. In re Arbitration Between The West of England Ship Owners Mut. Ins. Ass’n 
(Luxembourg) and American Marine Corp., 1992 WL 37700 (E.D. La. 1992); Antillean 
Marine Shipping Corp. v. Through Transp. Mut. Ins., Ltd., No. 02-22196-CIV, 2002 
WL 32075793, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 31, 2002); Jantran, Inc. v. Sphere Drake Ins., 
P.L.C., No. Civ.A.2:96CV085-D-B, 1997 WL 88259 (N.D. Miss. Feb. 18, 1997); 
Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Jantran, Inc., 906 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. La. 1995); McDermott Int’l, Inc. 
v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, Civ. A. No. 91-841, 1992 WL 37695 (E.D. La. 
Feb. 14, 1992); Assuranceforeningen Skuld (Gjensidig) v. Apollo Ship Chandlers, Inc., 
847 So. 2d 991 (Fla. Ct. App. 2003); Goshawk Dedicated Ltd v. Portsmouth Settlement 
Co., 466 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1297 (N.D. Ga. 2006); Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 
London v. Simon, 2007 WL 3047128 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 18, 2007); Clow v. Ins. Corp. of 
British Columbia, 2007 WL 2292689, *4 (D.Or. Aug 06, 2007) (“[M]ore recent and 
significantly more persuasive authority concludes that the Convention supersedes the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act.”). 
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contracts.  In contrast, the Second Circuit13
This Note examines the split in federal circuit courts created by 
Safety National Casualty Corp. on whether the MFA reverse-preempts 
the New York Convention and allows states to quash arbitration 
agreements in international insurance contracts.  Part I examines the 
legal framework governing arbitration in the United States, including the 
New York Convention and Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”).
 has held that the MFA 
reverse-preempts the New York Convention because it is a non-self-
executing treaty and it directly preempts the Convention’s implementing 
legislation.  As international insurers have increasingly relied on 
arbitration agreements, this circuit split is timely and likely to impact 
global business relations. 
14  It also 
explores the current state of insurance arbitration and the MFA.15  
Furthermore, Part I briefly reviews the doctrine of preemption and the 
status of treaties in United States law.  Part II discusses the split in 
federal authority, particularly both sides’ interpretations of United States 
foreign relations law and the MFA.16  Part III proposes two possible 
resolutions to the conflict in authority, both legislative and judicial.17  
Part III.A suggests that Congress should amend the MFA to exempt the 
New York Convention in light of the United States’ national policy 
favoring arbitration and the importance of arbitration in promoting 
international business.18  Part III.B offers a judicial solution.19  It 
contends that the Supreme Court should hold that the MFA does not 
enable state law to reverse-preempt the New York Convention or enable 
states to thwart arbitrations of disputes concerning insurance contracts.20  
This Note concludes that Congress and the Supreme Court should ensure 
that states do not have unlimited power to preclude international 
commercial parties from enforcing mutually agreed-upon arbitration 
clauses in insurance contracts.21
 
 
 
 13. See Stephens v. Am. Int’l Ins. Co., 66 F.3d 41, 41 (2nd Cir. 1995). 
 14. See infra Part I. 
 15. See infra Part I. 
 16. See infra Part II. 
 17. See infra Part III. 
 18. See infra Part III.A. 
 19. See infra Part III.B. 
 20. See id. 
 21. See infra Conclusion. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
This Part explains the language and legislative history of the New 
York Convention, FAA, and MFA.  It also briefly reviews United States 
foreign relations law concerning the status of treaties. 
A. THE MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT 
Enacted in 1945, the MFA protects states’ rights to regulate the 
insurance industry.22  The MFA has led the insurance industry to remain 
the only financial institution exclusively “subject to plenary state 
regulation.”23
1. Statutory Text 
 
The MFA recognizes that states have power to regulate and tax the 
insurance industry.24  It states, “Congress hereby declares that the 
continued regulation and taxation by the several States of the business of 
insurance is in the public interest.”25  It therefore provides that, “[n]o 
Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede 
any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business 
of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless 
such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance . . . .”26  By 
precluding an “Act of Congress” from “invalidat[ing], impair[ing], or 
supersed[ing]” a state law regulating insurance, the MFA enables state 
law27
 
 22. 15 U.S.C. § 1011. 
 to reverse-preempt a federal statute unless the federal statute 
 23. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The McCarran-Ferguson Act of 
1945: Reconceiving The Federal Role Insurance Regulation, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 13, 14 
(1993)  (“Among major financial institutions in the United States, only insurance firms 
are subject to plenary state regulation.”). 
 24. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a). 
 25. 15 U.S.C. § 1011. 
 26. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (emphasis added). 
 27. The state must have enacted the law for the purpose of regulating the insurance 
industry. See, e.g., Autry v. Northwest Premium Servs., Inc., 144 F.3d 1037, 1045 (7th 
Cir. 1998) (finding that an Illinois statute governing insurance premium finance 
agreements was not “enacted for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance,” 
and the McCarran-Ferguson Act’s “protective umbrella” therefore did not apply or 
reverse-preempt the Federal Truth in Lending Act). The Act only protects state statutes 
that regulate the “business of insurance.” Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Nat’l Sec., Inc., 
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“specifically relates to the business of insurance.”28  In other words, 
under section 1012, a state law reverse-preempts a federal law if (1) the 
state law was enacted “for the purpose of regulating the business of 
insurance,” (2) the federal statute does not “specifically relate to the 
business of insurance,” and (3) the federal statute would “invalidate, 
impair, or supersede” the state law.29
 
393 U.S. 453 (1969).  Whether a statute regulates the business of insurance is a 
threshold question for courts. Id.  The Supreme Court has explained that Congress only 
intended the Act to apply to the “relationship between insurer and insured, the type of 
policy which could be issued, its reliability, interpretation, and enforcement.” Id.  
Therefore, state statutes seeking to protect or govern the relationship between the 
insured and insurer constitute regulations related to the “business of insurance.” Id.  
Courts determine whether a regulated practice constitutes the “business of insurance” 
by considering whether the practice (1) has the effect of transferring or spreading a 
policyholder’s risk; (2) is integral in the policy relationship between the insurer and 
insured; and (3) is limited to entities within the insurance industry. Union Labor Life 
Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 120 (1982); see also Fuller v. Olson, 907 F. Supp. 257 
(W.D. Mich. 1995); United States v. Rhode Island Insurers’ Insolvency Fund, 892 F. 
Supp. 370 (D.R.I. 1995), judgment aff’d, 80 F.3d 616 (1st Cir. 1996); CenTra, Inc. v. 
Chandler Ins. Co., Ltd., 248 Neb. 844, 540 N.W.2d 318 (1995).  Courts have found that 
the following practices fall within the “business of insurance”: actual performance of an 
insurance contract, United States Dep’t of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 505 (1993), 
“retirement” certificates of deposit, American Deposit Corp. v. Schacht, 84 F.3d 834 
(7th Cir. 1996), statutory mandates concerning benefits and liability among insurance 
carriers, United of Omaha v. Bus. Men’s Assur. Co. of Am., 104 F.3d 1034 (8th Cir. 
1997), rate-making activity by insurers, Uniforce Temp. Pers., Inc. v. Nat’l Council on 
Comp. Ins., Inc., 87 F.3d 1296 (11th Cir. 1996), workers’ compensation reinsurance 
pools, id., the National Council on Compensation Insurance, id.  Alternatively, courts 
have found the following statutes do not relate to the business of insurance: (1) a state 
law allowing individuals to copy state filed insurance documents, B & S Underwriters, 
Inc. v. Clarendon Nat’l Ins. Co., 892 F. Supp. 815 (W.D. La. 1995), and (2) a state law 
allowing a third party to switch insurance beneficiaries under a power of attorney, 
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 897 F. Supp. 65 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d, 96 F.3d 18 (2d 
Cir. 1996).  Some courts contend that state statutes prohibiting arbitration do not 
regulate the business of insurance and the MFA therefore does not protect or enable 
them to reverse preempt the FAA or the New York Convention. See, e.g., Mut. 
Reinsurance Bureau v. Great Plains Mut. Ins. Co., Inc., 969 F.2d 931 (10th Cir. 1992); 
Standard Sec. Life Ins. Co. of New York v. West, 267 F.3d 821 (8th Cir. 2001). But see 
THOMAS H. OEHMKE, 2 COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 32:1 (2010) (“[A] provision in a 
state’s arbitration code excepting insurance contracts is a law regulating the business of 
insurance”).  Although this view warrants further discussion, it remains outside of this 
Note’s scope. 
  All courts agree that the New 
 28. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b). 
 29. See Suter v. Munich Reinsurance Co., 223 F.3d 150, 160 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing 
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York Convention does not “specifically relate[] to the business of 
insurance” under the MFA.30  If the application of a federal statute 
would not interfere or conflict with a state’s regulatory regime, then the 
federal measure may apply.31  Alternatively, if a federal measure 
specifically relates to the insurance industry, then it may trump state 
law.32
2. Legislative History 
 
Congress passed the MFA when panic ran rampant among members 
of the insurance industry after the Supreme Court declared that 
insurance constituted interstate commerce subject to the federal Sherman 
Antitrust Act.  The history of state-driven regulation of the insurance 
industry is unique and starkly contrasts with the regulatory history of 
related industries such as financial services and banking, which are 
subject to robust federal regulations.33  In the mid-nineteenth century, 
states began regulating the insurance industry to abate the rampant 
instability and insolvencies that resulted from fierce competition among 
insurers.34
 
Fabe, 508 U.S. at 491 (1993) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b))). 
  State regulatory bodies mainly rated insurance bureaus and 
 30. Id.; see also Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 
London, 587 F.3d 714, 720 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 31. See Humana Inc. v. Forsyth, 525 U.S. 299, 300 (1999). 
 32. See, e.g., Lovilia Coal Co. v. Williams, 143 F.3d 317, 324 (7th Cir. 1998) 
(finding that the Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA) specifically relates to the business of 
insurance and preempts state insurance law). 
 33. Since 1933, Congress, the courts, and the Securities Exchange Commission 
have expanded federal regulation over the securities industry, which coexist with state 
“blue sky” laws. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky 
Laws, 70 TEX. L. REV. 347, 348 (1991); JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND 
MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE (1984); Paul Curran Kingsbery, Stakeholder Inclusion 
and Shareholder Protection: New Governance and The Changing Landscape of 
American Securities Regulation, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 913, 922-23 (2009) (explaining 
options for regulatory change in the securities industry).  Likewise, federal regulation in 
the banking industry grew after Congress enacted the Banking Act in 1863 and national 
banks emerged. See Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of Competition in 
the Dual Banking System, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 677, 678 (1988) (“Federal preemption 
and uniformity, rather than competition and diversity, are the legal norms in banking 
regulation.”); see also Macey & Miller, supra note 23, at 20. 
 34. See Linda M. Lent, McCarran-Ferguson in Perspective, 48 INS. COUNS. J. 411, 
411 (1981) (citing U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Federal-State Regulation of the Pricing and 
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pooled risk data.35  Each state opened an insurance department to 
formulate regulations.36  In 1868, the Supreme Court acknowledged in 
Paul v. Virginia that the insurance industry was exclusively within the 
states’ domain and declared that the practice of issuing insurance 
policies did not constitute interstate commerce subject to Congress’ 
commerce power.37  The Supreme Court and lower courts subsequently 
reaffirmed that the states retained regulatory power over the industry.38
By the early twentieth century, state regulation became the industry 
norm.
 
39  In 1944, however, the Supreme Court undermined the sound 
foundation that Paul had established in United States v. South-Eastern 
Underwriters Ass’n (S.E.U.A.).40
 
Marketing of Insurance 5-8 (1977)). 
  In this case, the Antitrust Division of 
the Department of Justice prosecuted the S.E.U.A. along with its 198 
 35. Id. at 412. 
 36. Charles D. Weller, The McCarran-Ferguson Act’s Antitrust Exemption for 
Insurance: Language, History and Policy, 1978 DUKE L. J. 587, 589-90 (1978); 90 
CONG. REC. A4403-04 (1944); Brook, Public Interest and the Commissioners-All 
Industry Laws, 15 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 606 (1950); Lent, supra note 34, at 411. 
 37. 75 U.S. 168, 183 (1868) (“Issuing a policy of insurance is not a transaction of 
commerce . . . .”); see also Lent, supra note 34, at 411.  The Commerce Clause 
empowers Congress “[t]o regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the 
several states . . . .” U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 8, cl. 3; Weller, supra note 36, at 589 (“In the 
leading case, Paul v. Virginia, Supreme Court dictum that ‘[i]ssuing a policy of 
insurance is not a transaction of commerce’ was considered by many to mean that the 
federal government had no authority over the insurance industry under the commerce 
clause.”); Richard C. Reier, Casenote, Debate on State Versus Federal Regulation of 
Insurance Continues: American General Insurance Co. v. FTC, 359 F. Supp. 887 (S.D. 
Tex. 1973), 53 NEB. L. REV. 289, 291 (1974). 
 38. Spencer L. Kimball & Ronald N. Boyce, The Adequacy of State Insurance Rate 
Regulation: The McCarran-Ferguson Act in Historical Perspective, 56 MICH. L. REV. 
545, 553 (1958) (“From 1868 to 1944 it was generally assumed that insurance was not 
commerce, and was not subject to federal regulation.”); Peter B. Steffen, After Fabe: 
Applying the Pireno Definition of “Business of Insurance” in First-Clause McCarran-
Ferguson Act Clauses, 2000 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 447, 447 (“[T]he Paul Court likened 
issuing an insurance policy to agreeing to a personal contract, describing both as 
distinctly local transactions.”); Joseph B. Beach, The South-Eastern Underwriters’ 
Decision and Its Effect, 1947 WIS. L. REV. 321, 321 (1947); N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Deer 
Lodge Cnty., 231 U.S. 495, 502 (1913). 
 39. Kimball & Boyce, supra note 38, at 553; Steffen, supra note 38, at 447; Weller, 
supra note 36, at 589. 
 40. United States v. South East Underwriters Ass’n (S.E.U.A), 322 U.S. 533 
(1944); Reier, supra note 37, at 291; 91 CONG. REC. 1087 (1945) (statements of Rep. 
Hancock). 
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member companies in Georgia for violating the Sherman Antitrust Act 
by allegedly (1) fixing premium rates and agents’ commissions, (2) 
coercing nonmember companies into joining the S.E.U.A., and (3) 
conspiring to force individuals to buy from members on specified 
terms.41  In addition, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) alleged 
that a merger agreement between two insurance companies, the 
American General Insurance Company and the Deposit Company of 
Maryland, would substantially diminish competition and create a 
monopoly in violation of the Clayton Act.42  In a swift reverse that 
“shocked the industry” and contradicted 75 years of practice,43 the Court 
decided that federal regulations, particularly the Sherman Antitrust Act, 
applied to the insurance industry because insurance transactions 
constituted “interstate commerce” under the Commerce Clause of the 
United States Constitution.44  The Court then found that the Sherman 
Antitrust Act prohibited ratemaking combinations among defendant-
insurance companies.45
S.E.U.A. thrusted “[t]he entire industry [] in[to a state of] turmoil, 
[as insurance companies] expect[ed] to be abruptly subject to the full 
onus of federal antitrust legislation and possible federal takeover of 
insurance.”  “[S]ome insurance men thought the end of the world was 
come.”
 
46  The decision uprooted companies’ longstanding expectations 
of state regulation,47  and panic quickly ensued.48  Many feared that the 
Supreme Court would invalidate all state insurance regulations as 
unconstitutional.49
 
 41. S.E.U.A., 322 U.S. at 535 (1944). 
  Insurance companies nationwide therefore protested 
 42. Id. 
 43. See Lent, supra note 34, at 411; see also R.K. Powers, A Year of S.E.U.A., 23 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 317, 317 (1945). 
 44. S.E.U.A., 322 U.S. at 552-56; see also Joseph B. Beach, The South-Eastern 
Underwriters’ Decision and Its Effect, 1947 WIS. L. REV. 321, 322 (“The decision is 
very clear on the point that insurance is commerce and, insofar as transactions which 
cross state lines are concerned, interstate commerce.”). 
 45. S.E.U.A., 322 U.S. at 552-56. 
 46. Kimball & Boyce, supra note 38, at 554; Powers, supra note 43, at 320; 
Weller, supra note 36, at 590 (“The decision precipitated widespread controversy and 
dismay.  Chaos was freely predicted.”) (citing NEW YORK INSURANCE DEPARTMENT 
REPORT 71 (1969)). 
 47. See Lent, supra note 34, at 421; Reier, supra note 37, at 291; 91 CONG. REC. 
1087 (1945) (statements of Rep. Hancock)). 
 48. See supra note 46. 
 49. See id. 
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against paying state taxes.50  Indeed, in his dissent in S.E.U.A., Chief 
Justice Stone even predicted “a flood of litigation and of legislation 
involving challenges to the tax laws.”51  Insurance companies also 
feared imminent criminal prosecution under the Sherman Act for rate-
fixing practices.52  They vociferously called upon Congress to enact 
legislation to re-empower states to exclusively tax and regulate the 
industry.53
S.E.U.A. also shocked Congress and state legislatures.
 
54 They 
feared that the federal government would totally assume the states’ 
mandate of regulating the insurance industry55 and that the Roosevelt 
administration sought to federalize insurance regulation.56  In an address 
to state insurance commissioners, Senator Ferguson stated, “there is a 
domination today by the bureaucracy and there were a few people . . . in 
Washington that were licking their chops when they knew that the 
United States Supreme Court declared that the insurance business of 
America was interstate commerce.”57  Overall, the fate of insurance 
regulation remained uncertain.58
 
 50. See id. 
  The resulting widespread concern and 
 51. S.E.U.A., 322 U.S. at 583 (Stone, J., dissenting). 
 52. See Weller, supra note 36, at 590. 
 53. See Kimball & Boyce, supra note 38, at 554 (“But this emergency is immediate 
and it is necessary to pass this legislation now. The States do not know what to do -with 
respect to the collection of taxes and the insurance companies do not know what to do 
with respect to the payment of taxes.”); see also 91 CONG. REC. 1092 (1945). 
 54. J. Logan Murphy, Law Triangle: Arbitrating International Reinsurance 
Disputes Under the New York Convention, The McCarran-Ferguson Act, and 
Antagonistic State Law, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1535, 1544 (2008) (“The decision 
sparked an uproar that resounded through both Congress and state insurance 
departments.”); Weller, supra note 36, at 590 (quoting NEW YORK INSURANCE 
DEPARTMENT REPORT 71 (1969)) (“The decision precipitated widespread controversy 
and dismay.  Chaos was freely predicted.”); Harrington, An Exploration of the Effects of 
the S.E.U.A. Decision, 1944 INS. L. J. 590 (1944); Kimball & Boyce, supra note 38, at 
554 (1958); Lent, supra note 34, at 412. 
 55. See Murphy, supra note 54, at 1545 (“There existed a real fear of a federal 
takeover of the (previously assumed) state prerogative to regulate the insurance 
industry.”); see also Weller, supra note 36, at 591. 
 56. See Weller, supra note 36, at 591. 
 57. See id. (quoting 1947 NAIC PAOC. 69, 74 (remarks of Sen. Ferguson, Dec. 11, 
1946)). 
 58. See Powers, supra note 43, at 320 (quoting The Nat. Underwriter, Life Ins. Ed., 
June 9, 1944, p. 1.) (“Insurance D Day fell just a few hours before Eisenhower’s D Day 
. . . the mental commotion of insurance men was pitiable, as their attention was torn 
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dismay led Congress to take action, which eventually crystallized into 
the MFA.59
In response to the public’s outrage and the Supreme Court’s 
upheaval of commercial expectations, Congress swiftly acted to restore 
certainty in the insurance industry and preserve its century-long norm of 
state-regulation.
 
60  The MFA was a “very hastily formulated response.”61  
Anticipating that the Supreme Court would further infringe upon states’ 
rights, Congress agreed that the Act should re-empower state insurance 
commissioners to tax and regulate the industry.62  In articulating the 
Act’s objectives, Congress declared that it should ensure that no other 
federal law could “invalidate, impair, or supersede any State law which 
regulates . . . the insurance business, unless such act specifically so 
provides.”63  However, Congress remained divided over how to best 
achieve the proper balance of power.64
The House deliberated over and favored bills that aimed to 
completely exempt state insurance regulation from federal antitrust 
law.
 
65
 
between invasion headlines and their efforts to apprehend the consequences of the 
epochal, adverse U.S. Supreme Court decision.”); Thomas R. Powell, Insurance as 
Commerce, 57 HARV. L. REV. 937, 988 (1944).  But see Hugh Evander Willis, United 
States of America v. South –Eastern Underwriters Association, 258 INS. L.J. 390 (1944) 
(“The present United States Supreme Court has overruled another prior Supreme Court 
decision . . . and in doing so has done a fine piece of work.”). 
  Stock insurance companies particularly lobbied for complete-
 59. See Weller, supra note 36, at 589-91. 
 60. See Kimball & Boyce, supra note 38, at 554 (“Pending decision of [S.E.U.A.], 
there were unsuccessful attempts to exempt insurance from all federal regulation . . . .”); 
Powers, supra note 43, at 317. 
 61. See Lent, supra note 34, at 412. 
 62. See Edwin L. Smith, McCarran-Ferguson: A Perspective of Current Trends 
and Issues, 14 FORUM 1032, 1032 (1979); see also Weller, supra note 36, at 598 
(“[T]he McCarran Act was passed in reaction to the S.E.U.A. litigation.”); Murphy, 
supra note 54, at 1544. 
 63. See H.R. REP. NO. 79-143 (1945), reprinted in 1945 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 
670, 672. 
 64. Smith, supra note 62, at 1032 (“The McCarran-Ferguson Act was enacted in 
1945 in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. South-Eastern 
Underwriters Ass’n.”); see also Weller, supra note 36, at 698 (“[T]he McCarran Act 
was passed in reaction to the S.E.U.A. litigation.”). 
 65. See 91 CONG. REC. 1480-1481 (1945) (statements of Sen. Murdock); see also 
Kimball & Boyce, supra note 38, at 554; Lent, supra note 34, at 412. In particular, 
these bills sought to exempt the insurance industry from the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 1-7 (2006), the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1915, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 29, 52-53 
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exemption bills.66  Just 17 days after the S.E.U.A. decision, the House 
passed the Walter-Hancock Bill seeking to completely exempt the 
insurance industry from federal antitrust laws.67  However, on 
September 21, 1944, the Senate rejected the bill.68
The Senate sought to allow federal antitrust law to prevail when 
state and federal law conflicted.
 
69  It advocated for a system of “federal 
surveillance” in which the states would establish and implement 
regulations concerning rate-making combinations but the federal 
government would retain oversight powers.70  The Senate predicted that 
President Roosevelt would veto any complete-exemption bill.71  The 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (“NAIC”) also 
opposed complete-exemption bills because it maintained that “the 
insurance business has no more right to ask for a blanket exclusion from 
those acts than has any other business . . . [constituting] interstate 
commerce.”72  Likewise, the Life Insurance Association of America did 
not support the complete-exemption bills.73
 
(2006), and the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. § 41-58 (2006). See 
Kimball & Boyce, supra note 38, at 555; see also Weller, supra note 36, at 592. 
  The Senate therefore 
 66. See Weller, supra note 36, at 592. Congress considered the following bills: 
H.R. 3269, 78th Cong. (1st Sess. 1943); H.R. 3270, 78th Cong. (1st Sess. 1943); H.R. 
4444, 78th Cong. (2d Sess. 1944); S.1362, 78th Cong. (1st Sess. 1943); H.R. 1207, 79th 
Cong. (1st Sess. 1945); H.R. 1590, 79th Cong. (1st Sess. 1945); H.R. 1973, 79th Cong. 
(1st Sess. 1945); H.R. 2021, 79th Cong. (1st Sess. 1945); S. 12, 79th Cong. (1st Sess. 
1945); and S. 340, 79th Cong. (1st Sess. 1945). See Weller, supra note 36, at 592. 
 67. H.R. 3270, 78th Cong. (1944); see also 90 CONG. REC. 6565 (1944). The 
Senate also proposed a solution by passing the Baily-Van Nuys Bill (S. 1362). H.R. 
3270, 78th Cong. (1944); see also Powers, supra note 43, at 322; Weller, supra note 36, 
at 592 n.34; H.R. Rep. No. 79-143 (1945), reprinted in 1945 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 
670, 671 (“Your committee believes there is urgent need for an immediate expression 
of policy by the Congress with respect to the continued regulation of the business of 
insurance by the respective States.”); H.R. Rep. 873, 78th Cong. (1st Sess. 1943); 89 
CONG. REC. A5683-90 (1943) (remarks of Rep. LaFollette). 
 68. See Weller, supra note 36, at 592; see also 90 CONG. REC. 8054 (1944). 
 69. See Lent, supra note 34, at 412. 
 70. 91 CONG. REC. 1480-1481 (1945) (statements of Sen. Murdock); Kimball & 
Boyce, supra note 38, at 554. 
 71. Weller, supra note 36, at 592 n.34; 91 CONG. REC. 1087-88 (1945) (remarks of 
Rep. Hancock). 
 72. See Letter from David Forbes to Sen. Vandenberg (Nov. 22, 1944), reprinted in 
90 CONG. REC. 82; see also Weller, supra note 36, at 592 n.34. 
 73. Weller, supra note 36, at 592 n.34. 
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rejected subsequent complete-exemption proposals.74
The NAIC formulated an alternative approach that eventually 
evolved into the MFA.
 
75  It focused on both preserving state regulation 
of insurance and accommodating both state and federal law.76  On 
August 29, 1944, led by President and Massachusetts Commissioner 
C.F.J. Harrington, the NAIC Subcommittee on Federal Legislation 
produced a report calling for Congress to declare that (1) states could 
continue to regulate and tax the insurance industry, (2) the insurance 
industry was completely exempt from the FTC and Robinson-Patman 
Acts, and (3) the insurance industry was exempt from the Sherman and 
Clayton Acts for cooperative procedures related to rates, statistics, and 
coverage matters.77  On November 16, 1944, the Commissioners 
released a cohesive legislative proposal known as the “Commissioners’ 
Bill,”78 which followed the report by (1) preserving the constitutionality 
of state tax and regulation of the insurance industry, (2) mandating that 
federal law should not “invalidate, impair, or supersede” state insurance 
laws, (3) exempting insurance from the FTC and Robinson-Patman 
Acts, and (4) providing a limited exemption from the “non-regulatory” 
Sherman and Clayton Acts, including seven cooperative activities.79
The NAIC approach ultimately prevailed.
 
80  Senators Ferguson and 
McCarran introduced an amended version of the Commissioners’ Bill on 
December 19, 1944 to replace the unpopular complete-exemption bills.81
 
 74. Id. at 592. 
  
 75. Id. at 593. 
 76. Id. at 593 (quoting 945 NAIC Proc. 156, 159-60 (interim report of the 
Subcomm. on Fed. Legis.)) (“The decision of the United States Supreme Court in the 
South Eastern Underwriters case confronted Congress, the State Legislatures and the 
Insurance Commissioners with a problem-the task of preserving state regulation and at 
the same time not emasculating the federal anti-trust laws.”). The Commissioners 
sought to “preserv[e] state regulation of insurance, not in eliminating the applicability 
of federal antitrust laws.” Id.; Murphy, supra note 54, at 1544. 
 77. 90 CONG. REC. A4403-05; Weller, supra note 36, at 594; Powers, supra note 
43, at 323. 
 78. See 90 CONG. REC. A4406-08 (1944); Weller, supra note 36, at 594. 
 79. See Weller, supra note 36, at 594. The seven cooperative activities included 
including rate making, forms, adjustments, investigations, reinsurance commissions, 
and statistics from the Sherman Act, but acknowledging that the Sherman Act was 
applicable to boycotts, coercion or intimidation. Id. 
 80. S. 340, 79th Cong. (1st Sess. 1945); 91 CONG. REC. 330 (1945); Weller, supra 
note 36, at 595-96. 
 81. Weller, supra note 36, at 595-96; McFall, A Calendar of the S.E.U.A. Case, 
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One week later, the Senate debated and passed the bill with two 
amendments.82  The House and Senate later rejected each other’s 
amended versions of the bill and appointed their conference committee 
members to achieve a compromise.83  The conference committee 
ultimately reached a compromise bill.84  The House accepted the new 
version of the bill without debate.85 The Senate discussed and eventually 
adopted it on February 27, 1945.86  The final version of the bill that 
Congress passed was nearly identical to the Commissioners’ Bill.87  
President Roosevelt signed the bill into law on March 9, 1945, and it 
became known as the MFA.88
3. Purpose and Judicial Interpretations 
  The legislative history does not include 
any mention of arbitration, ratified treaties, or the FAA. 
The MFA thereby embodied Congress’ ultimate response and 
solution to S.E.U.A.89
 
265 INS. L.J. 72, 73 (1945); 91 CONG. REC. 330 (1945); Powers, supra note 43, at 324. 
  Congress enacted the MFA to “restore the 
 82. 91 CONG. REC. 464, 478-88 (1945). The Senate Judiciary Committee 
recommended the first amendment related to the antitrust law’s applicability to 
boycotts, coercion, and intimidation.  It was relatively uncontroversial.  Id.  The Senate 
quickly adopted it.  The second amendment concerned whether states should be allowed 
to pass laws contrary to the Sherman and Clayton Acts while regulating insurance. 91 
CONG. REC. 479-87 (1945); Weller, supra note 36, at 596.  Ultimately, the Senate 
decided that the states should not be permitted to regulate the insurance industry 
inconsistently with the antitrust laws. Weller, supra note 36, at 596; 91 CONG. REC. 486 
(1945). 
 83. 91 CONG. REC. 1208 (1945); Powers, supra note 43, at 325. 
 84. The compromise bill featured a new clause stating that that the Sherman, 
Clayton, and FTC Acts “shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent 
that such business is not regulated by State law.” 91 CONG. REC. 1396 (1945); Powers, 
supra note 43, at 325. 
 85. See 91 CONG. REC. 1396 (1945). 
 86. See 91 CONG. REC. 1442-44, 1477-89 (1945); Weller, supra note 36, at 597. 
 87. See Weller, supra note 36, at 599; see also Lent, supra note 34, at 412 (“The 
resulting bill came out of the conference committee almost exactly like a bill proposed 
by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners. (“‘NAIC’”) (citing NAIC 
Proc. 157-60 (1945))). 
 88. See Powers, supra note 43, at 325. The Roosevelt administration had also 
opposed legislation establishing a federal regulatory agency for insurance and remained 
hesitant to interfere with states’ regulation of the industry. See also Weller, supra note 
36, at 597; see also 91 CONG. REC. 482 (1945). 
 89. See Smith, supra note 62, at 1032 (“The McCarran-Ferguson Act was enacted 
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supremacy of the States in the realm of insurance regulation.”90  The 
House and Senate Reports on S. 340 continuously expressed concerns 
about preserving state insurance regulation and taxation under the 
Commerce Clause.91  In 1945, the House Committee on the Judiciary 
explained that the goal of the Act was to “declare that the continued 
regulation . . . by the several States of the business of insurance is in the 
public interest.”92  Senator Ferguson stated that the purpose of the MFA 
was to “establish the law as it was supposed to be prior to the rendering 
of the recent opinion of the Supreme Court . . .”93
There is a domination today by the bureaucracy and there were few 
people, I am satisfied, in Washington, that were licking their chops 
when they know that the United States Supreme Court declared that 
the insurance business of America was interstate commerce.  What a 
great bureau could be built . . . putting out of business these 48 
Commissioners here.
  Likewise, Senator 
McCarran stated, 
94
Overall, Congress believed that the states were better equipped to 
handle insurance regulation
 
95 and intended to prevent a federal insurance 
bureaucracy.96
However, Congress did not intend to “entirely overrule S.E.U.A., as 
the federal law would still apply in certain circumstances.”
 
97
 
in 1945 in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. South-Eastern 
Underwriters Ass’n.”); see also Weller, supra note 36, at 598 (“[T]he McCarran Act 
was passed in reaction to [the South-Eastern Underwriters] litigation.”). 
  The bill 
did not completely exempt the insurance industry from federal antitrust 
 90. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 500 (1993). 
 91. H.R. REP. NO. 79-68, at 2 (1945); S. REP. NO. 79-20, at 1-2 (1945). 
 92. H.R. REP. NO. 79-143 (1945), reprinted in 1945 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 670, 
672; Murphy, supra note 54, at 1544. 
 93. See Weller, supra note 36, at 599; see also 91 CONG. REC. 478 (1945); Lent, 
supra note 34, at 412 (“[M]aintenance of existing state regulation and taxation was the 
legislators’ preeminent objective”); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 429, 
430 (1946); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409 (1954); Wilburn Boat Co. v. 
Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955). 
 94. Lent, supra note 34, at 413. 
 95. See id. at 412; see also Note, Applications of Federal Antitrust Laws to the 
Insurance Industry, 46 MINN. L. REV. 1088, 1093-94 (1962). 
 96. See Lent, supra note 34, at 413. 
 97. Id.; see also Weller, supra note 36, at 602; Smith, supra note 62, at 1032-43. 
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law,98 but instead temporarily suspended the application of the Sherman 
and Clayton Acts to “assure more adequate regulation of this business in 
the States.”99  Overall, under the MFA, Congress intended federal law to 
apply to the insurance industry only when it directly regulates the 
industry.  Congress only prevented federal “ancillary legislation” from 
impinging upon states’ regulatory regimes.100
The Supreme Court has also continuously articulated that Congress 
designed the Act to preserve state regulation and taxation from 
constitutional challenge.
 
101  In interpreting the MFA, particularly the 
provision at issue in the circuit split, the Supreme Court has reserved 
room for federal regulations.  The Court noted that the Act does “not 
seek to insulate state insurance regulation from the reach of all federal 
law.”102  In addition, the Court has reiterated that the Act’s main purpose 
is to “protect state regulation . . . against inadvertent federal intrusion—
say, through enactment of a federal statute that describes an affected 
activity in broad, general terms, of which the insurance business happens 
to constitute one part.”103  The Act’s application to international 
commerce remains contested and unclear, particularly its applicability to 
treaties such as the New York Convention that conflict with state law.104
 
 98. 1945 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 670, 672 (1945); Murphy, supra note 54, at 1544. 
 
 99. 1945 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 670, 672 (1945). 
 100. See H.R. REP. NO. 79-143 (1945), reprinted in 1945 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 
670, 672 (stating that one of the purposes of the McCarran-Ferguson Act is that “no act 
of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any State law which 
regulates . . . the insurance business, unless such act specifically so provides”); Murphy, 
supra note 54, at 1544. 
 101. See Weller, supra note 36, at 599; Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 
408, 429-30 (1946) (“Obviously Congress’ purpose was broadly to give support to 
existing and future state systems for regulating and taxing the business of insurance. 
This was done in two ways. Once by removing obstructions which might be thought to 
flow from its own power, whether dormant or exercised, except as otherwise expressly 
provided in the Act itself or in future legislation. The other was by declaring expressly 
and affirmatively that continued state regulation and taxation of this business is in the 
public interest and that the business and all who engage in it ‘shall be subject to’ the 
laws of the several states in these respects.”). 
 102. Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 39 (1996). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Compare In re Arbitration Between W. of Eng. Ship Owners Mut. Ins. Ass’n 
(Lux.) & Am. Marine Corp., Nos. 91-3645, 91-3798, 1992 WL 37700, at *4-5 (E.D. La. 
Feb. 18, 1992) (“The McCarran-Ferguson Act does not apply to contracts made under 
the Convention, as it was intended to apply only to interstate commerce, not to foreign 
commerce.”), with Goshawk Dedicated Ltd. v. Portsmouth Settlement Co. I, 466 F. 
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4. The MFA’s Controversial Nature 
The MFA’s insulation of the insurance industry has become 
controversial since several major insurance companies failed in the 
1980s.105  Many characterize the MFA as an “emergency measure” with 
a broad exemption that favored the insurance industry but has since led 
to varying applications.106
The Supreme Court suggested that the exemption should be 
increasingly narrowed to comport with the Act’s intent.
 
107  Many courts 
and commentators have even regarded the Act as controversial in its 
application to antitrust.108  For instance, Lent states, “A thorough 
investigation into the McCarran Act and ensuing development cannot 
help but make one wonder whether it was all “much ado about nothing,” 
in the sense that the antitrust exemption was probably unnecessary in 
order to provide the limited protection originally intended by 
Congress.”109  She further explains that “misapplication of the Act . . . 
has served as a valuable escape for the insurance industry from the 
heavy burden of defending a federal antitrust suit on the merits.”  Critics 
have observed that state standards are too vague, regulatory staffs 
inadequate, rating bureaus dominated by the industry, and state 
provisions erratically enforced.”110
 
Supp. 2d 1293, 1310 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (rejecting the reasoning of England Ship 
Owners). 
  “The ultimate allocation of authority 
over the insurance industry must inevitably bear upon our ‘delicate 
 105. See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 23, at 15-18. From 1985 through 1986, 
liability insurance rates rapidly increased throughout the United States and limited the 
availability of insurance, which adversely impacted school boards, municipalities, 
charities, and smaller businesses. See id.; Kenneth S. Abraham, Making Sense of the 
Liability Insurance Crisis, 48 OHIO ST. L. J. 399 (1987); Susan Pulliam, Mutual Benefit 
Life is Expected to Ask State to Take Over as Early as Today, WALL ST. J., July 15, 
1991, at A3. 
 106. See Lent, supra note 34, at 416; see also Rosdeitcher, Recent Judicial 
Interpretation of the McCarran Act Antitrust Exemption, 13 FORUM 867, 875 (1978); 
Insurance Regulation and Antitrust Exemptions: McCarran-Ferguson, The Boycott 
Exception, and The Public Interest, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 140, 140-43 (1973). 
 107. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co v. Barry, 98 S. Ct. 2923, 2929-30 (1978); see 
also Lent, supra note 34, at 416. 
 108. Lent, supra note 34, at 429. 
 109. Id.; Whiting, The Case for Retaining the Exemption, 13 FORUM 917, 933 
(1979). 
 110. Lent, supra note 34, at 430 n.289. 
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balance of federalism.’”111
Congress has held hearings and submitted legislation to overturn 
the Act’s antitrust exemption.
 
112  In addition, the General Accounting 
Office and congressional committees became critical of state regulators 
handling insurers who face financial difficulty and proposed applying 
federal regulatory oversight to the industry.113  Others sought to establish 
a presidential commission to regularly review the industry.114  Scholars 
have called for “a comprehensive review of the McCarran-Ferguson 
Act’s pattern of regulatory federalism.”115  Over the past century, the 
debate over state versus federal regulation of insurance has continued to 
rage, but it has now embroiled arbitration.116
B. FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW AND THE NEW YORK CONVENTION 
 
In the insurance context, parties often elect to resolve disputes 
through arbitration.117
 
 111. Id. at 433 (“[W]e recognize that a national statute affecting the ability of a state 
to regulate insurance, in the manner of its own choosing poses significant issues of 
federalism.”). 
  Insurance parties generally prefer arbitration over 
traditional litigation because arbitration is more efficient and offers 
 112. See, e.g., H.R. 4813, 111th Cong. (2d Sess. 2010), 2009 CONG US HR 4813 
(Westlaw) (seeking to “restor[e] application of antitrust laws to insurers” by adding a 
clause in section 3 of the MFA stating, “[n]othing contained in this Act shall modify, 
impair, or supersede the operation of any of the antitrust laws with respect to price 
fixing, market allocation, or monopolization (or attempting to monopolize) by a person 
engaged in the business of insurance”); see also H.R. 1081, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 
2007), 2007 CONG US HR 1081 (Westlaw) (seeking to amend the MFA “to further 
competition in the insurance industry”); Macey & Miller, supra note 23, at 15-18; 
Compromise Isn’t Imminent on Bill to Alter McCarran-Ferguson Exemption, 62 
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.REP. (BNA) No. 1569, 757 (June 11, 1992). 
 113. See, e.g., General Accounting Office, Insurance Regulation: Assessment of the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (1991) (testimony before the 
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and 
Commerce); Steven Brostoff, Feds Unlikely to Pass Insurer Regs in 1993, NAT’L 
UNDERWRITER, Mar. 15, 1993, at 4. 
 114. See Macey & Miller, supra note 23, at 17; S.1276, 102d Cong. (1st Sess. 1991) 
(Presidential Insurance Commission Act). 
 115. See Macey & Miller, supra note 23, at 17. 
 116. Compare Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 
587 F.3d 714, 714 (5th Cir. 2009) with Stephens v. Am. Int’l Ins. Co., 66 F.3d 41, 41 
(2nd Cir. 1995). 
 117. Murphy, supra note 54, at 1540-41. 
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several advantages, such as privacy, finality, simplified procedures, cost 
reduction, and speed.118  Although commercial parties desire and 
contract for these benefits, many states limit the enforceability of 
arbitration agreements in insurance contracts.119  For instance, in the 
Fifth Circuit’s recent decision, a Louisiana statute stated that arbitration 
agreements in reinsurance agreements were unenforceable.120
Arbitration remains an integral component in international and 
domestic business relations.  It allows individuals to submit a dispute to 
one or more impartial adjudicators, who ultimately render a final 
binding decision.
 
121  Arbitration promotes international business by (1) 
assuring businesspeople that a qualified neutral party, whose skill 
enables him or her to understand their business’ intricacies, will 
adjudicate any dispute arising from their transactions and (2) providing 
parties with awards that are globally enforceable through the New York 
Convention, unlike litigation awards, which are not protected by any 
comparable treaty.122
 
 118. Id.; Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight from Arbitration: An 
Empirical Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly-Held 
Companies, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 340 (2007) (“[T]he bulk of authority seems to 
agree that arbitration is a more efficient dispute resolution process than litigation.”). 
  Parties may jointly elect to submit their disputes 
 119. See, e.g., supra note 7. 
 120. 587 F.3d at 715. 
 121. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, A GUIDE TO MEDIATION AND 
ARBITRATION FOR BUSINESS PEOPLE 5 (2007), available at 
http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=5010. 
 122. See Edward Ti Seng Wei, Why Egregious Errors of Law May Yet Justify a 
Refusal of Enforcement Under the New York Convention, 2009 SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 
592, 592 (2009); JULIAN D.M. LEW ET AL., COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION v (2003); ROBIN BURNETT & VIVIENNE BATH, LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS IN AUSTRALASIA 451-52 (2009); DAVID K. SCHOLLENBERGER 
& STEVEN P. FINIZIO, 1 TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS § 8:1 (2010) (“One 
key advantage is that, as a result of international conventions, arbitration awards are 
generally more widely enforceable outside the country of issue than court judgments.”); 
Daniel M. Kolkey, Dispute Resolution and International Commercial Agreements, 676 
PLI/Comm 527, 531 (1993); Laure Leservoisier & Clifford Chance, Enforcing 
Arbitration Awards and Important Conventions, in THE ARBITRATION PROCESS: 
COMPARATIVE LAW YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 255-56 (Dennis Campbell 
& S. Meek eds., 2002) (“One of the main advantages of international arbitration over 
litigation in national courts is that, due to the existence of a number of international 
conventions on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, foreign 
arbitral awards are, in principle, readily enforceable in many countries.”); Baxter Int’l, 
Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 315 F.3d 829 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding that arbitrators are free to 
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to arbitration in one of two ways.  First, from the outset of their dealings, 
parties may incorporate arbitration clauses in their contracts at the time 
they enter into the contract, agreeing that any dispute arising out of it 
“shall be settled by arbitration . . .”123  Alternatively, parties may sign an 
agreement submitting an existing dispute to arbitration.124  When a 
dispute arises, parties jointly select a neutral arbitrator or panel of 
arbitrators knowledgeable in their field.125  The arbitrator or panel 
conducts hearings in which the parties present their case and then 
renders an award.126  Both domestic and international parties often prefer 
to resolve their disputes through arbitration rather than through 
traditional litigation because arbitration is more efficient and offers 
several advantages.127
This Part explains the current legal framework governing 
arbitration in the United States, including the New York Convention and 
the FAA. 
 
1. New York Convention 
Drafted under the auspices of the United Nations in 1958, the New 
York Convention calls upon ratifying States to recognize and enforce 
foreign arbitral awards.128  Acknowledging that arbitration is an integral 
aspect of international commercial comity,129 the Convention sets forth a 
framework creating global dispute resolution mechanisms for conflicts 
arising under international agreements.130  Ratified by 144 States,131
 
decide the law and facts in arbitration pursuant to the parties’ agreement); 
 the 
Sphere Drake Ins. Inc. v. All Am. Life Ins., Co., 307 F.3d 617 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding 
that under an arbitration agreement, parties are free to specify how they will select 
neutral arbitrators). 
 123. See AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, supra note 121, at 18. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 19. 
 126. Id. at 19-25. 
 127. See Shelley McGill, Consumer Arbitration Clause Enforcement: A Balanced 
Legislative Response 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 361, 362 (2010); see also Eisenberg & Miller, 
supra note 118, at 340 (“[T]he bulk of authority seems to agree that arbitration is a 
more efficient dispute resolution process than litigation.”); Edward Brunet, The Core 
Values of Arbitration, in ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA 3, 3-28 (2006). 
 128. See New York Convention, supra note 5; McGill, supra note 127, at 362. 
 129. Murphy, supra note 55, at 1540-41. 
 130. See New York Convention, supra note 5. 
 131. See UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/ 
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Convention remains the “‘backbone’ to the acceptance of international 
arbitration by the business world.”132
a. Text 
 
Article I of the Convention provides for the enforcement of 
international arbitration agreements.133  Enforcement requires an 
“agreement in writing” that is “signed by the parties.”134
Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing 
under which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any 
differences which have arisen or which may arise between them in 
respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not, 
concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration. 
  Article II 
discusses States’ duties to enforce agreements to arbitrate, stating, 
In Article III, the Convention directs domestic courts to “recognize 
arbitral awards as binding and enforce them under the rules of procedure 
of the territory where the award is relied upon.”135  It prohibits States 
from “impos[ing] substantially more onerous conditions or higher fees 
or charges on the recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards . . .”136
b. Implementing Legislation 
 
Congress implemented the treaty in the Convention Act, which 
incorporates the FAA to the extent that it does not conflict with the New 
York Convention.137  The Act makes the Convention enforceable in 
United States federal courts.138
 
NYConvention_status.html. 
  The implementing legislation diverges 
from the treaty only in its language instructing courts to compel 
 132. Wei, supra note 122, at 592; LEW ET AL., supra note 123, at v. 
 133. See New York Convention, supra note 5, art. I. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (2006); Todd v. Steamship Mut. Underwriting Ass’n 
(Bermuda) Ltd., 601 F.3d 329, 331 (5th Cir. 2010); Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons v. 
Toys “R” Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15, 20 (2d Cir.1997) (“[T]he FAA and the Convention 
have ‘overlapping coverage’ to the extent that they do not conflict”) (quoting Bergesen 
v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 934 (2d Cir.1983)). 
 138. 9 U.S.C. § 201 (2006). 
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arbitration if the parties have a valid arbitration agreement.139  It uses 
permissive language instead of the Convention’s mandatory language in 
Article II, stating that a court “may direct that arbitration be held in 
accordance with” an agreement140 and that any award conferred under 
such an agreement “shall [be] confirm[ed] unless [the court] finds one of 
the grounds for refusal or deferral of recognition or enforcement of the 
award specified in the Convention.”141
c. Policy and Judicial Interpretations 
 
Arbitration offers significant benefits to commercial parties 
engaged in cross-border transactions and promotes their willingness to 
participate in global business.142  The Convention provides a neutral 
forum for international dispute resolution “without the perception of the 
home court advantage or territorial bias.”143  Furthermore, foreign 
companies tend to fear litigation in the American legal system with its 
prospect of awarding plaintiffs putative damages.144  Arbitration allows 
foreign parties to avoid excessive damages and retain more control over 
the awards system.  Conversely, American commercial parties similarly 
fear litigating in other countries’ courts.145
 
 139. Letter from H.G. Torbert, Jr., Acting Assistant Sec’y for Cong. Relations, 
Dep’t of State, to John W. McCormack, Speaker of the House of Representatives (Dec. 
3, 1969) (requesting the enactment of the implementing legislation for the Convention), 
attached to and made a part of H.R. REP. NO. 91-1181 (1970) (“[S]ection 206 is 
permissive rather than mandatory.”). 
  The Convention therefore 
 140. 9 U.S.C. § 206. 
 141. 9 U.S.C. § 207. The House Report further explained that section 206 “is simply 
an instruction to domestic courts regarding venue and concerns inherent to the 
enforcement of the language of the Convention.” H.R. REP. NO. 91-1181, at 2 (1970). 
 142. Brief for Professors of International Arbitration by Siegfried Wiessner as 
Amicus Curiae, Marathon Oil Co. v. Ruhrgas AG, 9 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION 
REPORT 137, 139 (1998) (“[T]he capacity to incorporate in international contracts 
enforceable obligations to use an agreed-upon neutral forum is a critical part of the 
willingness of commercial parties to enter into transborder contracts and, in short, to 
participate in the global economy.”). 
 143. McGill, supra note 127, at 364-65; Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Exercise of 
Contract Freedom in the Making of Arbitration Agreements, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. 1189, 1194-99 (2003). 
 144. Id. 
 145. See Beijing Arbitration Commission, Straus Institute for Dispute Resolution, 
East Meets West: An International Dialogue On Mediation and Med-Arb in the United 
States and China, 9 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 379, 384 (2009) (“American business does 
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creates more certainty and predictability among commercial parties.  
Arbitrators are also more likely to understand the nuances of the parties’ 
specialized business relations. 146  By establishing a dispute resolution 
regime that affords parties a high degree of “neutrality and 
understanding of the specific issues in conflict” apart from domestic 
court systems, the Convention allows commercial parties to develop 
autonomous business relationships independent of their countries, 
provides them with predictability regarding how they will resolve any 
potential disputes, and assures parties that their awards will be enforced, 
unlike litigation awards where no such assurance exists.147
Federal law strongly favors arbitration in international commercial 
transactions.
 
148
 
not want to be in a foreign court. That’s why, in every contract that is drafted, an 
American business will spend a lot of time drafting a dispute resolution clause setting 
up a system for resolving the dispute, which more than likely ends up in arbitration.”); 
Ya-Wei Li, Dispute Resolution Clauses In International Contracts: An Empirical Study, 
39 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 789, 790 (2006) (“[U]nderstanding the language of foreign 
courts and navigating their complex procedural laws are anathema to many American 
businesses and their lawyers.”); HAROLD BROWN ET AL., FRANCHISING REALITIES AND 
REMEDIES § 5.03A (2003) (“The United States Supreme Court has underwritten the 
enforceability of international arbitration covenants, particularly as the parties’ choice 
to avoid the uncertainties of litigation in foreign courts.”); 1 TRANSNAT’L JOINT 
VENTURES § 1:22 (2010) (“[H]uge court backlogs and undeveloped legal systems scare 
off Americans from using courts in many foreign countries, and both parties tend to fear 
a “home court” advantage going to the other side.”); James J. Meyers, International 
Construction Dispute Resolutions and New Alternatives, 3 INT’L CONSTR. L. REV. 221 
(1986) (explaining that American construction companies favor arbitration of disputes 
arising from construction contracts because “[l]itigation of international construction 
contract disputes in a foreign court often presents serious disadvantages to Americans” 
in that courts may “openly favor their own nationals,” “foreign court procedures are 
often complex and unpredictable[,] “[f]oreign local counsel will usually not be familiar 
with the history of the contract and the disputes, lack necessary technical expertise 
[and’ adequate background in the law and public policy with respect to the contact 
period[,] . . . [and] there are few effective mechanisms for enforcing foreign 
judgments”). 
  In Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., the Supreme Court 
explained the Convention’s objectives “to encourage the recognition and 
enforcement of commercial arbitration agreements in international 
 146. See Wei, supra note 122, at 592; see also DOMINICO DI PIETRO & MARTIN 
PLATTE, ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AWARDS: THE NEW YORK 
CONVENTION OF 1958 11 (2001). 
 147. See id. 
 148. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974); Del Orbe v. 
Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 549 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1368 (S.D. Fla. 2008). 
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contracts and to unify the standards by which agreements to arbitrate are 
observed and arbitral awards are enforced in the signatory countries.”149  
Congress’ implementation of the Convention further reflects that the 
federal government supports enforcing arbitral agreements, and 
awards.150
In deciding a motion to compel arbitration involving an 
international commercial agreement under the Convention, courts 
conduct a “very limited inquiry.”
 
151  Where a dispute arises from an 
international commercial agreement, a court must enforce the agreement 
and compel arbitration under the Convention if the agreement meets the 
following four jurisdictional pre-requisites: (1) it is in writing152 (2) the 
agreement provides for arbitration in the territory of a signatory of the 
Convention,153 (3) the agreement arose from a “commercial” legal 
relationship,154 and (4) a party to the agreement is not an American 
citizen155
 
 149. See Scherk, 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974). 
 or the commercial relationship has some reasonable relation 
 150. See id. 
 151. See Bautista v. Star Cruises, 396 F.3d 1289, 1294 (11th Cir. 2005); see also 
Francisco v. Stolt Achievement MT, 293 F.3d 270, 273 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 
537 U.S. 1030 (2002); DiMercurio v. Sphere Drake Ins. PLC, 202 F.3d 71, 74 (1st Cir. 
2000); Ledee v. Ceramiche Ragno, 684 F.2d 184, 186 (1st Cir. 1982). 
 152. New York Convention, supra note 5, arts. II(1)-(2); Bautista, 396 F.3d at 1294, 
n.7; Std. Bent Glass Corp v. Glassrobots Oy, 333 F.3d 440, 449 (3d Cir. 2003); Ledee, 
684 F.2d at 186-87 (“A court presented with a request to refer a dispute to arbitration . . 
. must resolve four preliminary questions: (1) Is there an agreement in writing to 
arbitrate the subject of the dispute?”). Article II, section 2 of the Convention provides, 
“[t]he term ‘agreement in writing’ shall include an arbitral clause in a contract or an 
arbitration agreement, signed by the parties or contained in an exchange of letters or 
telegrams.” New York Convention, supra note 5, arts. II(1)-(2). 
 153. New York Convention, supra note 5, arts. I(1), (3); 9 U.S.C. § 206; see also 
Declaration of the United States upon accession, reprinted in 9 U.S.C.A. at 154 n.29 
(1982 Supp.); Bautista, 396 F.3d at 1294, n.7; Std. Bent Glass Corp., 333 F.3d at 449; 
Ledee, 684 F.2d at 186-87 (“Does the agreement provide for arbitration in the territory 
of a signatory of the Convention?”). 
 154. See New York Convention, supra note 5, art. I(3); 9 U.S.C. § 202; see also 
Declaration of the United States upon accession, reprinted in 9 U.S.C.A. at 154 n.29 
(1982 Supp.); Bautista, 396 F.3d at 1294, n.7; Std. Bent Glass Corp., 333 F.3d at 449; 
Ledee, 684 F.2d at 186-87. 
 155. See New York Convention, supra note 5, art. I(3). An “American citizen” for 
the purpose of commercial entities includes any company incorporated or having its 
principal place of business in the United States. William W. Park, When The Borrower 
And The Banker Are At Odds: The Interaction Of Judge And Arbitrator In Trans-border 
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with one or more foreign states.156  A court must compel arbitration 
unless the parties do not fulfill one of the four prerequisites or one of the 
Convention’s defenses applies.157  “The affirmative defenses authorized 
by the Convention have a ‘limited scope’ allowing parties to avoid 
arbitration only where the arbitration is ‘null and void, inoperative or 
incapable of being performed.’”158  The Courts interpret the null and 
void clause narrowly and have found that it only encompasses situations 
that neutrally apply globally, such as fraud, mistake, duress, and 
waiver.159
2. Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) 
 
Domestically, policymakers and legislators also recognize the 
distinct benefits of arbitration, particularly as a “means of reducing the 
burden on public courts.”160  Enacted on February 12, 1925, the FAA 
directs courts to stay any judicial proceeding “referable to arbitration” if 
the parties present a valid written arbitration agreement.161
 
Finance, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1323, 1331 n.25 (1991) (citing A. VAN DE BERG, THE NEW 
YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958 56-71 (1978)); William W. Park, National 
Law and Commercial Justice: Safeguarding Procedural Integrity in International 
Arbitration, 63 TUL. L. REV. 647, 681 n.132 (1989). 
  Chapter 1, 
section 2 of the FAA promotes arbitration as an alternative means to 
resolving disputes, stating that any “written provision . . . to settle by 
arbitration a controversy . . . arising out of such contract or transaction . . 
. shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as 
 156. See 9 U.S.C. § 202; see also Declaration of the United States upon accession, 
reprinted in 9 U.S.C.A. at 154 n.29; Bautista, 396 F.3d at 1294 n.7; Std. Bent Glass 
Corp., 333 F.3d at 449; Ledee, 684 F.2d at 186-87 (“Is a party to the agreement not an 
American citizen, or does the commercial relationship have some reasonable relation 
with one or more foreign states?”). 
 157. See Vacaru v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., No. 07-23040-CIV, 2008 WL 
649178, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Feb.1, 2008); Bautista, 396 F.3d at 1294-95; Std. Bent Glass 
Corp., 333 F.3d at 449; Czarina, LLC v. W.F. Poe Syndicate, 358 F.3d 1286, 1292 n.3 
(11th Cir. 2004) (“[J]urisdictional prerequisites to an action confirming an award are 
different from the several affirmative defenses to confirmation.”); DiMercurio v. Sphere 
Drake Ins., 202 F.3d 71, 79 (1st Cir. 2000). 
 158. See Goshawk Dedicated Ltd. v. Portsmouth Settlement Co., 466 F. Supp. 2d 
1293, 1304 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (quoting Bautista, 396 F.3d at 1302). 
 159. See Bautista, 396 F.3d at 1302; see also Del Orbe v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, 
Ltd., 549 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1369 (S.D. Fla. 2008). 
 160. See Carbonneau, supra note 143, at 1195-99. 
 161. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2006). 
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exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”162  Under 
this provision, the FAA makes pre- and post-dispute arbitration 
agreements “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.”163
Congress appended the New York Convention’s implementing 
legislation to the FAA in Chapter 2.  Other sections of the FAA 
primarily relate to federal court.
 
164  However, section 2 equally applies 
to state and federal courts because it covers maritime and interstate 
commercial transactions, which could arise in both.165
3. Preemption of State Law 
 
In Southland Corp. v. Keating,166
 
 162. Id. 
 the Supreme Court held that the 
 163. Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland: Reexamining the Legislative 
History of The Federal Arbitration Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101, 123 (2002). 
 164. Id. Section 3 provides for stays pending arbitration in “any of the courts of the 
United States.” Id. § 3. Section 4 allows a petition to compel arbitration in “any United 
States district court.” Id. § 4. Section 5 empowers the court to designate and appoint 
arbitrators, id. § 5, and section 6 specifies the applicable procedures for applying to a 
court. Id. § 6.  Section 7 deals with petitioning to compel attendance at arbitration 
proceedings and section 8 addresses cases raised under admiralty jurisdiction. Id. § 7. 
Sections 9 through 11 establish procedures for enforcing and challenging arbitral 
awards, while also allowing parties to raise actions in “the United States court in and for 
the district wherein the award was made.” Id. §§ 9-11. Sections 12 and 13 set forth 
procedures for such actions. Id. §§ 12-13. 
 165. See Sennett v. Nat’l Healthcare Corp., 272 S.W.3d 237 (Mo. Ct. App. S.D. 
2008) (2008) (explaining that the FAA’s substantive law applies in state courts while its 
procedural provisions do not necessarily bind state courts); Drahozal, supra note 163, at 
125; (suggesting that section 2 of the FAA incontrovertibly applies in state court, and 
the remainder of the Act has a more limited application in state court under a literal 
reading but may be broader under other interpretations); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. 
Cornfield, 918 N.E.2d 1140 (Ill. App. Ct.2009). See generally PAUL COLTOFF, 3 ILL. 
LAW AND PRACTICE ARBITRATION AND AWARDS § 2 (2010) (“Federal Arbitration Act 
created substantive federal law that is applicable in both federal and state courts.”); 
DAVID E. RIGNEY, 2 S.C. JURY ARBITRATION § 6 (“Unless the parties have contracted to 
the contrary, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) applies in federal or state court to any 
arbitration agreement regarding a transaction that in fact involves interstate commerce, 
regardless of whether or not the parties contemplated an interstate transaction.”); JOHN 
R. KENNEL, 3A FLA. JURY 2D ARBITRATION AND AWARD § 6 (2010) (“The Federal 
Arbitration Act . . . applies to both federal and state court proceedings . . . .”); CHARLES 
ALAN WRIGHT ET. AL., 19 FED. PRAC. & PROC. JURIS. § 4514 (2d ed.) (2010) (“Federal 
law created under the Federal Arbitration Act applies in both federal and state courts.”). 
 166. 465 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1984). 
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FAA applies in state courts and preempts conflicting state law.  The 
Court addressed a state law that conflicted with the FAA and found that 
it violated the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause.167  The Court stated, 
“[i]n creating a substantive rule applicable in state as well as federal 
courts, Congress intended to foreclose state legislative attempts to 
undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements.”168  Essentially the 
Court “‘federalized’ United States arbitration law, ‘restrict[ing] state 
legislative rights’ so as ‘to guarantee the ‘unobstructed enforcement’ of 
arbitration agreements.”169  The majority first reviewed the Act’s text 
and explained that the interstate commerce requirement in the FAA’s 
section 2 indicates that Congress intended the Act to apply in state 
court.170  Citing Metro Indus. Painting Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co.,171 
the Court further found that “‘the purpose of the act was to assure those 
who desired arbitration and whose contracts related to interstate 
commerce that their expectations would not be undermined by federal 
judges, or . . . by state courts or legislatures.’”172  Chief Justice Burger 
also concluded that the FAA’s legislative history strongly indicates that 
Congress intended federal arbitration law to preempt state law.173
 
 167. Id. at 16. 
  The 
 168. Id. at 16 (referring to the Arbitration Act). 
 169. Drahozal, supra note 163, at 101 (quoting 1 IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL 
ARBITRATION LAW § 10.6.1, at 10:25 (Supp. 1999) (describing Southland as an 
“exceptionally important” case)). 
 170. Southland, 465 U.S. at 14-15. 
 171. 287 F.2d 382, 387 (2d Cir. 1961). 
 172. Id. 
 173. Southland, 465 U.S. at 12 (“Congress had in mind something more than 
making arbitration agreements enforceable only in the federal courts.”). The Court 
quoted House Report 96, which stated that “[t]he purpose of this bill is to make valid 
and enforcible [sic] agreements for arbitration contained in contracts involving 
interstate commerce or within the jurisdiction or [sic] admiralty, or which may be the 
subject of litigation in the Federal courts.” Id. at 12-13 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 
1 (1924)). The majority also referred to two statements indicating Congress’ objective 
to overturn the common law’s refusal to enforce arbitration agreements, quoting the 
remarks of Senator Walsh during the 1923 Senate Hearings that the Act “sought to 
overcome the rule of equity, that equity will not specifically enforce an[y] arbitration 
agreement.” Id. at 13 (quoting Sales and Contracts To Sell in Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce, and Federal Commercial Arbitration: Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the 
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 6 (1923) (statements of Sen. Walsh)) 
(alteration in original); H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1-2 (1924) (noting the need for 
“legislative enactment” to overturn the common law precedent). The opinion also noted 
that while enacting the Act, Congress was aware that state courts generally remained 
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Court noted that Congress “contemplated a broad reach of the 
[Arbitration] Act, unencumbered by state-law constraints.”174
The problems Congress faced were therefore twofold: the old 
common-law hostility toward arbitration, and the failure of state 
arbitration statutes to mandate enforcement of arbitration 
agreements. To confine the scope of the Act to arbitrations sought to 
be enforced in federal courts would frustrate what we believe 
Congress intended to be a broad enactment appropriate in scope to 
meet the large problems Congress was addressing.
  The 
majority summarized the FAA’s legislative history, stating, 
175
 
unwilling to enforce arbitration agreements. Southland, 465 U.S. at 13-14. It cited 
statements in the 1923 Senate Hearings that explained how state courts invalidated and 
refused to enforce arbitration agreements. Id. at 13 (“Some of our courts have held . . . 
that an agreement to arbitrate and to permit A and B to fix the fees of the arbitrators and 
so make a final award is invalid, in that it invades the province of the court and sets up 
another tribunal that is not provided by law, and in a sense, as some people put it, is 
immoral.”). Some of the legislative history of the FAA directly indicates that Congress 
intended the FAA to apply to state courts. See Drahozal, supra note 163, at 101. 
Although the FAA’s “primary purpose” was to ensure arbitration agreements were 
enforceable in federal court, the FAA’s drafter, Julius Henry Cohen, even noted that 
Congress had power under the Commerce Clause to require state courts to enforce 
arbitration agreements. Id. In 1926, the American Arbitration Association described the 
FAA’s scope, stating, “The United States Arbitration Act . . . established a national 
policy and procedure for the settlement by arbitration of controversies arising out of 
inter-state commerce or maritime transactions, or within the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts.” Drazhol, supra note 163, at 146-47 (citing Model Arbitration Act (Am. 
Arbitration Ass’n 1926), in Model Arbitration Statute Offered, 10 J. AM. JUDICATURE 
SOC’Y 122, 124, 126 (1927)). In a commentary published after Congress enacted the 
FAA, the ABA’s Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law discussed the 
constitutionality of the FAA making arbitration agreements enforceable in state court 
and reiterated Cohen’s Brief’s argument from the 1924 Hearings. Comm. on 
Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law, ABA, The United States Arbitration Law and 
Its Application, 11 A.B.A. J. 153 (1925). It suggested that the FAA applies in state 
court: 
 
Speaking in general terms, the act provides that written clauses providing for 
arbitration of future disputes contained in any contract relating to maritime 
transactions (i.e., matters which would normally be embraced in admiralty 
jurisdiction) or involving interstate commerce shall be valid, irrevocable and 
enforceable except on the grounds for which any contract may be revoked. The 
same rules apply to a submission to arbitration of a controversy already existing. 
Id. at 153-54. 
 174. Southland, 465 U.S. at 12. 
 175. Id. at 14. 
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The Court further supported its conclusion by noting that limiting 
the FAA to federal courts would otherwise “encourage and reward 
forum shopping.” 176
Later, the Supreme Court applied Southland to find that the FAA 
preempted section 229 of the California Labor Code, which precluded 
arbitration of a state law action for wages.
 
177  In Allied-Bruce Terminix 
Cos. v. Dobson, the Court reaffirmed Southland and held that section 2 
of the FAA applies in state courts.178  It found that the FAA extends to 
the full reach of Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce and 
that a contract need only involve “commerce in fact.”179  Following 
Southland and Allie-Bruce, the Court found that the FAA preempted a 
Montana statute that invalidated arbitration agreements formed without 
conspicuous notice.180
 
 176. Id. at 14-15. 
  Subsequently, while narrowly interpreting the 
employment exception to the FAA, the Court rejected an argument that 
“a state statute ought not be denied state judicial enforcement while 
 177. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 490-91 (1987). 
 178. 513 U.S. 265 (1995). The Court also rejected a request submitted by twenty 
state attorneys general calling the Court to overrule Southland and preserve the 
“powerful interests of federalism.” Id. at 272; see Brief for Attorneys General of 
Alabama et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 265 
(No. 93-1001). The states that signed on to the brief were Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, 
Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, 
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South 
Carolina, Utah, and Vermont. Amici Curiae Brief, Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 265. The 
majority did not delve into the FAA’s legislative history, but explained its reasoning as 
follows: 
The Southland Court . . . recognized that the pre-emption issue was a difficult one, 
and it considered the basic arguments that respondents and amici now raise (even 
though those issues were not thoroughly briefed at the time). Nothing significant 
has changed in the ten years subsequent to Southland; no later cases have eroded 
Southland ‘s authority; and no unforeseen practical problems have arisen. 
Moreover, in the interim, private parties have likely written contracts relying upon 
Southland as authority. Further, Congress, both before and after Southland, has 
enacted legislation extending, not retracting, the scope of arbitration. For these 
reasons, we find it inappropriate to reconsider what is by now well-established 
law. 
Id. at 272. 
 178. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 272. 
 179. Id. at 273-77. It does not require the parties to have “contemplated substantial 
interstate activity.” Id. at 277-80 (quoting Metro. Indus. Painting Corp. v. Terminal 
Constr. Co., 287 F.2d 382, 387 (2d Cir. 1961)). 
 180. See Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996). 
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awaiting the outcome of arbitration.”181  It emphasized that Southland 
and Allied-Bruce remained the settled standard for preemption doctrine 
concerning the FAA.182
Following Southland, lower courts also consistently found that the 
FAA preempted several state laws.
 
183  Some commentators have 
attributed parties’ increasing use of arbitration clauses in contracts to 
Southland’s assurance that federal courts would allow the FAA to 
preempt state laws and uphold arbitration clauses and awards.184
4. National Policy and Presumption Favoring Arbitration 
 
In interpreting arbitration clauses under the FAA and the 
Convention, the Supreme Court has continuously expressed a strong 
presumption favoring the enforcement of arbitration provisions in 
international commercial transactions, which requires courts to resolve 
any doubts concerning the construction of arbitration clauses in favor of 
arbitration.185
 
 181. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 124-25 (2001). This case, 
however, did not decide whether the FAA preempted a state statute. Id. 
  “Section 2 is a congressional declaration of a liberal 
 182. Id. 
 183. Drahozal, supra note 163, at 101 (citing 1 IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL 
ARBITRATION LAW § 10.8.3, at 10:96-10:101). 
 184. Id. at 101; Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages and the Consumerization 
of Arbitration, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 9 (1997); see also Richard E. Speidel, Consumer 
Arbitration of Statutory Claims: Has Pre-Dispute [Mandatory] Arbitration Outlived Its 
Welcome?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1069, 1072 (1998) (discussing consumerization of 
arbitration); Sarah R. Cole, Uniform Arbitration: “One Size Fits All” Does Not Fit, 16 
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 759, 786-88 & nn.92-100 (2001) (cataloguing current and 
pending state laws that restrict consumer and employment arbitration). 
 185. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 23 
(1983); Mar-Len of Louisiana, Inc. v. Parsons-Gilbane, 773 F.2d 633, 635 (5th Cir. 
1985); Seafort Shipping Corp. v. The W. of Eng. Ship Owners Mut. Protection and 
Indem. Ass’n, No. 88-4605, 1988 WL 135179, at *5 (E.D. La. Dec. 12, 1988) 
(“[W]here a contract contains an arbitration clause, there exists a strong presumption 
that arbitration should not be denied unless it can be said with positive assurance that an 
arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation which would cover the dispute 
at issue.”) (internal quotations omitted); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Marathon Oil Co., 
794 F.2d 1080 (5th Cir. 1986); Houston General Insurance Co. v. Realex Group, N.V., 
776 F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1985); see also Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 
n. 15 (1974); Del Orbe v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 549 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1368 
(S.D. Fla. 2008). 
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federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.”186  Courts of Appeals 
“have [also] consistently concluded that questions of arbitrability must 
be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring 
arbitration.”187  Some courts have even enforced an arbitration clause 
after finding the underlying contract void.188  This national policy 
promotes and upholds private contractual arrangements.189  In Mitsubishi 
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., the Supreme Court 
“conclude[d] that concerns of international comity, respect for the 
capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the 
need of the international commercial system for predictability . . . 
require that we enforce parties’ agreements, even assuming that a 
contrary result would be forthcoming in a domestic context.”190  In light 
of the strong national policy favoring the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements, courts have created a robust body of federal arbitration law 
applicable in both federal and state courts.191
C. FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: SELF-EXECUTING V.  
NON-SELF-EXECUTING TREATIES 
 
Courts interpret treaties such as the Convention according to the 
United States’ body of foreign relations law.192  They will enforce and 
apply a treaty if it is either self-executing or non-self-executing but 
implemented by Congress through legislation.193
 
 186. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 23. 
  In other words, self-
executing treaties do not require any implementing legislation to be 
enforceable.  In contrast, non-self executing treaties require 
implementing legislation.  Categorizing a treaty as either self-executing 
or non-self executing is a difficult exercise requiring a complicated 
opaque analysis, and Congress therefore often implements treaties 
 187. Id. 
 188. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Comprehensive Business Serv. Co., 833 F.2d 1159 (5th 
Cir. 1987)). 
 189. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625 
(1985). 
 190. Id. at 629 (emphasis added). 
 191. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1984). 
 192. See Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 760 (1988); 
CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 371 (2006). 
 193. Id. (“Since early in U.S. history, . . . the Supreme Court has . . . held that, in the 
absence of implementing legislation, only self-executing treaties are judicially 
enforceable.”). 
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through legislation to ensure that they are enforceable.194  Here, 
Congress implemented the New York Convention, stating that the 
Convention “shall be enforced in United States courts.”195  Under the 
Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, “all Treaties . . . shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land” and supersede state law.196
 
 
II. CIRCUIT SPLIT AFTER SAFETY NATIONAL CASUALTY CORP. V. 
CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD’S 
This Part summarizes recent federal cases that have led the circuit 
courts to diverge over whether the MFA reverse-preempts the 
Convention and allows states to invalidate arbitration provisions of 
international insurance contracts.  In 2009, the Fifth Circuit decided 
Safety National Casualty Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 
London and created a federal circuit split over whether the MFA allows 
a state law to reverse-preempt the Convention in the context of 
insurance arbitration agreements.  The Fifth Circuit and many district 
courts held that the MFA does not reverse-preempt the Convention and 
refused to allow states to nullify arbitration agreements in international 
insurance contracts.  In contrast, the Second Circuit held that the MFA 
protects states’ right to regulate the insurance industry and authorizes 
state law prohibiting arbitration agreements in insurance contracts to 
reverse-preempt the Convention and its implementing legislation. 
 
 
 194. Compare Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924) (finding that a treaty 
between Japan and the U.S. giving citizens the ability “generally to do anything incident 
to or necessary for trade upon the same terms as native citizens” while within the 
borders of the state was self-executing), with United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 876-
77 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding Article 6 of the Convention on the High Seas was non-self-
executing). See generally Murphy, supra note 54, at 1544 n.106 (“[D]espite the 
difficulties of the determination of treaty of self-execution, some trends do emerge: 
Bilateral treaties tend to be found to be self-executing more often than multilateral 
conventions, and provisions of a treaty affecting or prescribing specific, individual 
rights tend to be found to be self-executing more often than those providing for general 
obligations of the state-party.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 3 (John Jay) (1787), available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed03.asp (“Under the national government, 
treaties and articles of treaties . . . will always be expounded . . . and executed . . . .”). 
 195. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (2006). 
 196. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
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A. SAFETY NATIONAL AND OTHER FEDERAL CASES  
OPPOSING REVERSE-PREEMPTION 
The Fifth Circuit and several district courts have opposed applying 
the MFA’s reverse-preemption provision to the New York Convention. 
1. The Fifth Circuit 
In Safety National Casualty Corp.,197
a. Facts 
 a dispute arose among three 
insurers over arbitration agreements in their contracts. 
The Louisiana Safety Association of Timbermen-Self Insurers Fund 
(“LSAT”) provides workers’ compensation insurance and entered into 
reinsurance agreements with Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London 
(“Underwriters”).198  Safety National Casualty Corporation (“Safety 
National”) also provides excess insurance coverage and alleged that 
LSAT assigned its rights under the agreements to Safety National.199  
Underwriters refused to acknowledge this assignment and maintained 
that LSAT’s rights were non-assignable.200  The agreement included 
arbitration provisions, stating that an arbitrator would resolve any legal 
disputes between the contracting parties.201
Safety National filed suit against Underwriters, which then filed a 
motion to stay the proceeding and compel arbitration.
 
202  The district 
court granted the motion and the arbitration commenced.203  The three 
parties, however, failed to agree on selecting an arbitrator.  Underwriters 
then returned to the district court and filed a motion to lift the stay to 
join LSAT as a party to the litigation.204  LSAT moved to intervene, lift 
the stay, and quash the arbitration, contending that the arbitration 
agreements were invalid under Louisiana state law.205
 
 197. 587 F.3d 714 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 
 198. Id. at 717. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
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The District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana granted 
LSAT’s motion and held that under the MFA, the Louisiana state law206 
prohibiting arbitration agreements in insurance contracts reverse-
preempted the New York Convention.207
b. Holding 
  The Fifth Circuit later reversed 
the District Court’s decision and held that the MFA did not allow the 
Louisiana state law to reverse-preempt the New York Convention or the 
FAA. 
The Fifth Circuit subsequently reheard the case en banc.208  It again 
reversed the District Court’s decision, recognized that the New York 
Convention applied, and held that the arbitration provisions among the 
companies in different countries were enforceable.209  Writing for the 
majority, Judge Priscilla Owen maintained that the Louisiana state law 
did not reverse-preempt the Convention because the MFA does not 
apply to the Convention.210
Following the interpretive framework established by Medellin v. 
Texas,
 
211
 
 206. The Louisiana statute stated: 
 the court reviewed the text of the Convention, the Convention 
No insurance contract delivered or issued for delivery in this state and covering 
subjects located, resident, or to be performed in this state . . . shall contain any 
condition, stipulation, or agreement . . . [d]epriving the courts of this state of the 
jurisdiction of action against the insurer . . . Any such condition, stipulation, or 
agreement in violation of this Section shall be void . . . . 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:868 (2009). Louisiana courts have held that arbitration 
agreements are not enforceable under this statute. See Doucet v. Dental Health Plans 
Mgmt. Corp., 412 So. 2d 1383, 1384 (La. 1982) (“Classification of the contract at issue 
as an insurance contract renders the arbitration provisions of that contract unenforceable 
under [LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:868 (2009)].”); see also McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. 
Lloyds Underwriters of London, 120 F.3d 583, 586 (5th Cir.1997) (“Compulsory 
arbitration clauses in certain insurance contracts are unenforceable in Louisiana because 
of [LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:868] . . . .”); W. of Eng. Ship Owners Mut. Ins. Ass’n 
(Luxembourg) v. Am. Marine Corp., 981 F.2d 749, 750 n.5 (5th Cir.1993) (“Louisiana 
has prohibited arbitration clauses in insurance policies.”) (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
22:868; Doucet, 412 So. 2d at 1384). 
 207. Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 587 F.3d 
714, 717-18 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 208. Id. at 718. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 717. 
 211. 552 U.S. 491, 506 (2008) (“The interpretation of a treaty, like the interpretation 
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Act, and the MFA.212  It found that the Louisiana state statute conflicted 
with the United States’ commitments under the Convention because the 
Convention contains mandatory language, stating that signatory nations 
“‘shall recognize any agreement in writing under which the parties 
undertake to submit to arbitration’” and directing “court[s] of a 
Contracting State . . . [to] refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds 
that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of 
being performed.”213  In addition, the court noted that the Convention 
Act similarly contains mandatory language, stating that the Convention 
“shall be enforced in the United States courts.”214
While reviewing the applicability of the MFA, the court 
emphasized that the statute only requires courts to construe “Act[s] of 
Congress” not to “invalidate, impair, or supersede” state law regulating 
insurance unless the Act specifically relates to the business of insurance. 
The majority conceded that the Convention and its implementing 
legislation do not explicitly relate to the business of insurance,
 
215 but 
then reasoned that the Convention does not constitute an “Act of 
Congress” under the MFA because it is a treaty.216  Judge Owen 
remained reluctant to categorize the Convention as a self-executing or 
non-self-executing treaty, and acknowledged that the Convention’s 
current status remains “unclear.”217
The majority maintained that the treaty’s categorization as non-self-
executing or self-executing is irrelevant because a treaty such as the 
Convention is not an Act of Congress.
  However, she sidestepped 
categorizing the treaty by focusing on whether “Act of Congress” 
encompasses non-self-executing treaties implemented by Congress. 
218  It contended that “[t]he fact 
that a treaty is implemented by Congress does not mean that it ceases to 
be a treaty and becomes an ‘Act of Congress.’”219
 
of a statute, begins with its text.”). 
  In reaching this 
conclusion, the court analyzed the commonly understood meaning of 
 212. 587 F.3d at 718. 
 213. Id. at 719 (quoting New York Convention, supra note 5). 
 214. 9 U.S.C. § 201 (2006). 
 215. 587 F.3d at 720. In footnote 21, however, the court contemplated the possibility 
of the FAA relating to the business of insurance because it diminishes business risk. 587 
F.3d at 720 n.21. However, it neglected to further opine on that issue. Id. 
 216. Id. at 721-22. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. at 722. 
 219. Id. at 723. 
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“Act of Congress” and found that it does not include treaties, even non-
self-executing treaties that require implementing legislation.220  In the 
court’s view, Acts of Congress include neither self-executing nor non-
self-executing treaties because “a treaty remains an international 
agreement or contract negotiated by the Executive Branch and ratified 
by the Senate, not by Congress” regardless of its execution status.221  In 
other words, Congress’ implementation of a treaty does not transform it 
into an Act of Congress.  The court also reviewed the MFA’s legislative 
history and found that nothing suggests that  Congress distinguished 
between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties at the time while 
generally referencing treaties in statutes.222  It additionally noted that the 
Convention Act only operates with reference to the Convention itself, 
directing courts to the treaty in resolving disputes.223  To further support 
its view, the court cited several cases suggesting that courts may 
recognize implemented provisions of non-self-executed treaties as 
federal law.224
After determining that “Act of Congress” does not include treaties, 
the court then addressed whether Congress intended state law to reverse 
preempt an implemented non-self-executing treaty while enacting the 
MFA.
 
225  Citing Missouri v. Holland,226
 
 220. Id. at 722-23 
 the court found that historically 
 221. Id. at 723. 
 222. Id. at 730-31. 
 223. 9 U.S.C. § 202. 
 224. Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 727 n.54 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Lim v. 
Offshore Specialty Fabricators, Inc., 404 F.3d 898, 902–03 (5th Cir.2005) (‘‘It goes 
without saying that, upon the United States signing a treaty and Congress adopting 
enabling legislation, the treaty becomes the supreme law of the land.’’); McDermott 
Int’l, Inc. v. Lloyds Underwriters of London, 120 F.3d 583, 586 (5th Cir. 1997) 
(refusing to decide ‘‘whether the Convention preempts LA. R.S. 22:629’’); Sedco, Inc. 
v. Petroleos Mexicanos Mexican Nat’l Oil Co., 767 F.2d 1140, 1145 (5th Cir. 1985); 
Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888)). 
 225. Id. at 727-28. 
 226. 252 U.S. 416 (1920). In this landmark case delineating Congress’ constitutional 
powers under United States foreign relations law, the court held that Congress’ 
implementation of a non-self-executed treaty, which the United States had entered into 
with Great Britain to protect migratory birds and Congress implemented, was 
constitutional under the Necessary and Proper Clause. It held the validity of the 
implementing legislation turned on the constitutionality of the treaty. Id. at 432. The 
court stated, “Acts of Congress are the supreme law of the land only when made in 
pursuance of the Constitution, while treaties are declared to be so when made under the 
authority of the United States.” Id. at 433. 
2011] ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL 637 
INSURERS’ EXPECTATIONS 
 
courts have analyzed treaties as distinct from their implementing 
legislation and generally do not equate them with “Acts of Congress.”227  
Furthermore, because treaties occupy a superior position in preemption 
doctrine, the court found that when enacting the MFA, Congress 
unlikely intended the Act to enable state law to reverse-preempt a treaty 
or to restrict the United States’ ability to negotiate and implement a 
treaty that has a wide-ranging application.228
Furthermore, the majority declined to apply the last-in-time rule
 
229 
because the doctrine only resolves conflicts between a treaty and its 
implementing legislation.230  Here, the court found that this case does 
not feature such a conflict because the Convention does not conflict with 
its implementing legislation, the Convention Act.231
Finally, the court further supported its interpretation of the MFA by 
stressing the United States’ policy favoring arbitration in international 
commercial agreements.
 
232  It cited Mitsubishi Motors Corp in which the 
Supreme Court considered the arbitrability of Sherman Act claims 
where parties entered into a valid arbitration agreement.233  In Mitsubishi 
Motors Corp., the Court reasoned “[a]s international trade has expanded 
in recent decades, so too has the use of international arbitration to 
resolve disputes arising in the course of that trade.”234  The Fifth Circuit 
relied on the Supreme Court’s assertion that arbitration is fundamental to 
the nation’s success in the “international legal order” and that domestic 
courts must therefore “subordinate domestic notions of arbitrability to 
the international policy favoring commercial arbitration.”235
The Fifth Circuit applied the Supreme Court’s analytical 
framework, which directs courts to review a statute’s legislative history 
 
 
 227. Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 728. 
 228. Id. at 729. 
 229. Under the last in time rule, when a statute and treaty conflict, the court will 
follow the rule set forth in whichever document Congress adopted last. See Whitney v. 
Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888) (enforcing a later-enacted law exempting Hawaiian 
sugar from duty despite its conflict with an earlier treaty with the Dominican Republic); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 115 
(1987). 
 230. Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 728-29. 
 231. Id. at 729. 
 232. Id. at 730. 
 233. Id. 
 234. 473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
 235. Id. at 638-39. 
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when a controversy involving arbitration implicates statutory rights to 
discern whether Congress meant to exclude arbitration as a means to 
resolve a particular type of dispute.236  Under this analysis, if Congress 
intended to exclude a category of disputes from arbitration, then courts 
must assume that Congress would have indicated its intention in the 
statute.237  In the MFA, the court found no indication that Congress 
sought to exclude disputes involving insurance agreements from 
arbitration or that Congress intended to distinguish between self-
executing and non-self-executing-but-implemented treaties.238  The court 
relied on Stephens v. National Distillers & Chemical Corp.239 in which 
the Second Circuit held that the MFA did not allow a state law requiring 
out-of-state insurers to post security before a court proceeding to 
preempt the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, and noted that the Act 
does not “force federal law that clearly intends to preempt altogether 
state laws to give way simply because the insurance industry is 
involved.”240  The majority therefore found that the MFA does not 
enable states to circumvent the Convention and prohibit arbitration 
agreements in the insurance context.241
c. Concurrence 
 
While the majority remained unwilling to address whether the 
Convention is self-executing, Judge Edith Brown Clement’s concurrence 
embraced the question and took a more constitutional approach.242  She 
affirmatively maintained that Article II of the Convention is self-
executing and preempts Louisiana state law under the Supremacy 
Clause.243  Judge Clement supported this conclusion through the 
interpretative analysis established in Medellin.244
 
 236. See Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d 714, 730 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)). 
  Under the Medellin 
framework, a court must review a treaty’s text, its “negotiation and 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. 
 239. 69 F.3d 1226 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 240. In this case, however, the Second Circuit declined to opine on or overrule 
Stephens v. American Int’l Ins. Co., 66 F.3d 41 (2nd Cir. 1995). Id. 
 241. Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 730-31. 
 242. Id. at 732. 
 243. Id. at 732-33. 
 244. Id. (citing Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008)). 
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drafting history” and the signatories’ “post-ratification 
understanding.”245  Judge Clement reasoned that Article II(3) of the 
Convention is self-executing because it directly addresses the 
Contracting States’ domestic courts rather than the States themselves, 
and uses mandatory language that imposes affirmative obligations on 
domestic courts, instead of leaving decisions about arbitration 
enforcement to the States’ discretion.246  Because Article II does not 
require Congress to pass implementing legislation, Judge Clement 
concluded that Article II is enforceable in United States courts on its 
own terms.247
d. Dissent 
 
The dissent presented the opposite argument of the concurrence’s 
reasoning.  Writing for the dissent and joined by Judges Jerry E. Smith 
and Emilo M. Garza, Judge Jennifer Walker Elrod maintained that the 
Convention is non-self-executing and that the majority erred in 
formulating the question before the court as whether the Convention is 
an “Act of Congress” under the MFA.248  Judge Elrod suggested that the 
proper question was whether the FAA, as the Convention’s 
implementing legislation, constitutes an Act of Congress.249  The dissent 
concluded that the FAA is indeed an Act of Congress to which the MFA 
applies and enables state law to reverse-preempt because the FAA does 
not relate to the business of insurance.250  The dissent also noted that the 
Underwriters failed to preserve their argument that Article II is self-
executing before the en banc court, but regarded the treaty as non-self-
executing.251
 
 245. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506-07 (2008) (citations omitted). 
 
 246. 587 F.3d at 734-35. 
 247. Id. at 734. 
 248. Id. at 737. 
 249. Id. at 737-38. 
 250. Id. at 747-49. This is a question outside the scope of this Note. 
 251. Id. at 738, 742, 752 n.31. The concurrence maintained that Underwriters 
focused their argument before the en banc court on the question presented by the panel, 
and thus did not waive the argument that Article II is self-executing. Id. at 733 n.2. 
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2. Lower Federal Court’s Interpretations of  
the MFA and Convention 
Several district courts arrived at the same conclusion as the 
majority of the Fifth Circuit in Nat’l Safety under two different 
approaches. 
a. The MFA Legislative History Approach 
In Matter of Arbitration between the West of England Ship Owners 
Mutual Insurance Ass’n (Luxembourg) & American Marine Corp.,252 the 
Eastern District of Louisiana found that the MFA only applies to 
interstate commerce, not international agreements.  The West Of 
England Ship Owners Mutual Insurance Association filed a motion to 
order arbitration of a dispute with one of its members, Oil Transport 
Group, pursuant to its governing rules.253  The Oil Transport Group 
argued that the Convention did not apply because Louisiana law 
invalidated the arbitration agreement.254
 
 252. In re Arbitration Between W. of Eng. Ship Owners Mut. Ins. Ass’n 
(Luxembourg) & Am. Marine Corp., Nos. 91-3645, 91-3798, 1992 WL 37700 (E.D. La. 
Feb. 18, 1992). 
  It further argued that under the 
 253. Id. at *1-2. Rule 62 “Arbitration” stated, 
If any difference or dispute shall arise between a member or former member or any 
other person claiming under these Rules and the Association out of or in 
connection with these Rules or any bye law made thereunder or arising out of any 
contract between the Member or former Member and the Association as to the 
rights or obligations of the Association or the Member or former Member 
thereunder or in connection therewith or as to any other matter whatsoever, such 
difference or dispute shall be referred to the Arbitration in London of a sole legal 
Arbitrator. Such Arbitrator shall be a practicing Queen’s Counsel of the 
Commercial Bar and if unavailable any other practicing Queen’s Counsel and a 
submission to arbitration in all the proceedings therein shall be subject to the 
provisions of the Arbitration Act 1950 and any Statutory modification or re-
enactment thereof. In any such Arbitration any matter decided or stated in any 
Judgment or Arbitration Award (or in any reasons given by an Arbitrator or 
Umpire for making Award) relating to proceedings between the Member or former 
Member and any third party, shall be admissible in evidence. No Member or 
former Member may bring or maintain any action, suit or other legal proceedings 
against the Association in connection with any such difference or dispute unless he 
has first obtained Arbitration Award in accordance with this Rule. 
Id. at *2. 
 254. Id. at *4.  The Louisiana statute R.S. 22:629 states, 
No insurance contract delivered or issued for delivery in this state and covering 
subjects located, resident, or to be performed in this state . . . regardless of where 
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MFA, the Louisiana statute preempted the FAA and Convention.255  The 
court disagreed and determined that the Convention should apply and 
preempt state law because Congress did not intend the MFA to cover 
international arbitration agreements.256  Citing Triton Lines, Inc. v. 
Steamship Mutual Underwriting Ass’n.257 the court reasoned that 
Congress intended the MFA to only cover interstate commerce, not 
foreign commerce.258  The court referenced the Supreme Court’s “strong 
presumption favoring the enforcement of arbitration provisions 
whenever possible.”259  It also noted the trend of courts of appeals’ 
decisions emphasizing that “questions of arbitrability must be addressed 
with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration . . . [so 
that] any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be 
resolved in favor of arbitration.”260
The court further reasoned that “jurisprudence is clear that when 
state law conflicts with the Convention, the Supremacy Clause mandates 
the application of the Convention.”
 
261  Citing Southland Corp., it 
explained that Congress sought to prevent states from “undercut[ting] 
the enforceability of arbitration agreements.”262  It therefore upheld the 
arbitration agreement between the Association and the Oil Transfer 
Group and found that their dispute must be resolved through arbitration 
pursuant to English law under their agreement.263  The court concluded 
that federal arbitration law, not Louisianan law, applied because federal 
law preempted state law despite the MFA.264
Relying on the reasoning in West of England Ship Owners, several 
 
 
made or delivered shall contain any condition, stipulation, or agreement . . . (2) 
Depriving the courts of this state of the jurisdiction of action against the insurer . . .  
 255. Id. at *4-5. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Triton Lines, Inc. v. Steamship Mut. Underwriting Ass’n (Bermuda), 707 F. 
Supp. 277, 278-79 (S.D. Tex. 1989). 
 258. 1992 WL 37700, at *4 (“The McCarran-Ferguson Act does not apply to 
contracts made under the Convention, as it was intended to apply only to interstate 
commerce, not to foreign commerce.”). 
 259. Id. at *2 (citing Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 
U.S. 1, 23 (1983) (“Section 2 [of the Arbitration Act] is a congressional declaration of a 
liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.”)). 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. at *4. 
 262. Id. at *4 (citing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984)). 
 263. Id. at *2. 
 264. Id. at *5. 
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other district courts have reached similar conclusions and enforced 
international arbitration agreements under the Convention despite anti-
arbitration state statutes covered by the MFA.265  These courts have 
consistently found that reverse preemption under the Act did not apply 
to international insurance contracts because the MFA was only designed 
to apply to interstate commerce, not foreign commerce.266
 
 265. See Antillean Marine Shipping Corp. v. Through Transp. Mut. Ins., Ltd., No. 
02-22196-CIV, 2002 WL 32075793, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 31, 2002) (relying on West of 
England Ship Owners and stating that the McCarran-Ferguson Act “does not apply to 
international insurance contracts made under the Convention” because it provides that 
“the states, and only the states, can regulate the substantive content of insurance 
contracts,” which “was intended to apply only to interstate commerce, and not foreign 
commerce”); Jantran, Inc. v. Sphere Drake Ins., P.L.C., No. Civ. A. 2:96CV085-D-B, 
1997 WL 88259 (N.D. Miss. Feb. 18, 1997); Continental Ins. Co. v. Jantran, Inc., 906 
F. Supp. 362 (E.D. La. 1995); McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s of 
London, Civ. A. No. 91-841, 1992 WL 37695 (E.D. La. Feb. 14, 1992); see also 
Assuranceforeningen Skuld (Gjensidig) v. Apollo Ship Chandlers, Inc., 847 So. 2d 991 
(Fla. Ct. App. 2003). The lower courts are more varied in deciding whether the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act enables state anti-arbitration statutes to reverse preempt federal 
law in the insurance context. Compare Hamilton Life Ins. Co. v. Republic Nat’l Life 
Ins. Co., 408 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1969) (holding that the McCarran-Ferguson Act does 
not preclude the application of the Federal Arbitration Act because the state arbitration 
statute was not one regulating the business of insurance, but a method of handling 
contract disputes generally); Triton Lines, Inc. v. S.S. Mut. Underwriting Assoc., 707 F. 
Supp. 277 (S.D. Tex. 1989) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act preempted a state 
anti-arbitration provision in the insurance code because a disputed claim, and its 
subsequent resolution, is not the business of insurance), and Bernstein v. Centaur Ins. 
Co., 606 F. Supp. 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act 
preempted a state policy against arbitrating insurance claims because the state did not 
have a statute that specifically prohibited arbitration in the insurance industry), with 
McKnight v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., Inc., 358 F.3d 854 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that a 
portion of the Georgia Arbitration code was “law regulating the business of insurance” 
and reverse-preempted the Federal Arbitration Act by way of the McCarran-Ferguson 
Act), Mut. Reinsurance Bureau v. Great Plains Mut. Ins. Co., Inc., 969 F.2d 931 (10th 
Cir. 1992), cert denied, 506 U.S. 1001 (1992) (holding that an arbitration clause in a 
Kansas reinsurance agreement was unenforceable under a Kansas statute excluding 
insurance contracts as valid arbitration agreements because the McCarran-Ferguson Act 
precluded application of the Federal Arbitration Act), and Eden Financial Group, Inc. v. 
Fidelity Bankers Life Ins. Co., 778 F. Supp. 278 (E.D. Va. 1991) (holding that the 
Federal Arbitration Act does not preempt a state receivership statute concerned with the 
arbitration of insurance company disputes because the McCarran-Ferguson Act 
provides that it is the province of the states to regulated the business of insurance). 
  They also 
 266. Id. 
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emphasized the national policy favoring arbitration.267
b. The International Arbitration Policy Approach 
 
Likewise, in Goshawk Dedicated Ltd. v. Portsmouth Settlement 
Co.,268 the Northern District of Georgia found that the Convention 
supersedes the MFA, but took a different approach.  Goshawk, a British 
insurer, sought to compel arbitration of a dispute with a Georgia-based 
investment company under their reinsurance contract.269  Goshawk 
argued that the Convention and its implementing legislation controlled 
the parties’ contract and required the court to enforce their arbitration 
agreement.270  A Georgia statute, however, prohibited courts from 
enforcing arbitration agreements in “[a]ny contract of insurance.”271  
The Georgia reinsurer contended that Georgia law invalidated the 
arbitration agreement because the state law reverse-preempted the 
Convention under the MFA.272  Although the court agreed that the 
arbitration agreement would have been invalid domestically because the 
MFA allowed the Georgia statute to reverse-preempt the FAA,273 it held 
that the arbitration agreement was enforceable under the Convention due 
to “policies recognized in the context of international commerce that 
strongly favor enforcement of arbitration clauses.”274
The court found that the Convention “supersedes” the MFA and 
 
 
 267. Id. 
 268. 466 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1297 (N.D. Ga. 2006). 
 269. Id. at 1296. 
 270. Id. 
 271. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-2(c)(3). The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
and Supreme Court of Georgia previously found that this statute reverse-preempted 
federal law because it was aimed at protecting or regulating the “relationship between 
insurer and insured.” See SEC v. Nat’l Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 460 (1969); see also 
McKnight, 358 F.3d at 858; Love, 614 S.E.2d at 479-80. 
 272. 466 F. Supp. 2d at 1297. 
 273. The District Court of Georgia previously held that the Federal Arbitration Act 
does not preempt Georgia’s anti-arbitration statute under the McCarran-Ferguson Act 
because of the FAA’s strong policy favoring the enforcement of arbitration agreements 
in insurance contracts. McKnight, 358 F.3d at 858-59 (11th Cir. 2004) (concluding that 
the Federal Arbitration Act does not preempt Georgia’s anti-arbitration statute due to 
the McCarran-Ferguson Act); Love, 614 S.E.2d at 49 (holding that the McCarran-
Ferguson Act “prohibits the [Federal Arbitration Act] from preempting” Georgia’s anti-
arbitration statute). 
 274. 466 F. Supp. 2d at 1306. 
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noted that the Eleventh Circuit recognized that the Convention generally 
prevails over previously enacted domestic inconsistent rules of law.275  It 
found that the Eleventh Circuit limited the defenses available in 
international arbitration to those recognized in the Convention, 
excluding the MFA.276  Finally, the court noted that the Supreme Court 
has repeatedly held that the importance of international comity and 
ensuring predictability in international commerce require courts to 
enforce international agreements to arbitrate, even if the agreements 
would otherwise be invalid domestically.277  The court therefore 
concluded that the Convention trumps the MFA due to the “strong 
international policy it expresses in favor of enforcing commercial 
arbitration agreements” and applied to the agreement because “state law 
defense[s are] outside the scope of the affirmative defenses allowed 
under the Convention.”278
Other district courts have adopted the reasoning and international 
policy approach articulated in Goshawk.
 
279  One commentator also 
proposed that the Supreme Court should adopt and expand Goshawk and 
suggested more international law based solutions.280
B. THE SECOND CIRCUIT APPROACH SUPPORTING REVERSE-PREEMPTION 
 
In contrast, in Stephens v. American Int’l Ins. Co., the Second 
Circuit held that foreign reinsurers could not compel arbitration because 
the MFA enables state law to reverse-preempt the Convention.281
1. Facts 
 
Delta America Reinsurance Company, a Kentucky-chartered 
 
 275. Id. at 1309. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. at 1309-10. 
 278. Id. at 1303 n.8, 1311. 
 279. See, e.g., Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. Simon, No. 1:07-cv-
0899-LJM-WTL, 2007 WL 3047128, at *6-7 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 18, 2007); Clow v. Ins. 
Corp. of B. C., No. 07-403-ST, 2007 WL 2292689, at *4 (D. Or. Aug 06, 2007) 
(“[M]ore recent and significantly more persuasive authority concludes that the 
Convention supersedes the McCarran-Ferguson Act.”). 
 280. Murphy, supra note 54, at 1544. 
 281. 66 F.3d 41, 43 (2d Cir. 1995). 
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reinsurer, became insolvent.282  Under the Kentucky Insurers 
Rehabilitation and Liquidation Law,283 the Commissioner of Insurance 
oversaw the company’s liquidation.284  The Commissioner filed suit 
against various companies that had transferred risk to Delta, seeking to 
both recover premiums owed to Delta and to obtain an order requiring 
specific performance of the company’s remaining obligations to pay all 
future premiums.285  The companies refused to pay the premiums, 
contending they were entitled to set off the premiums against losses 
owed to them by Delta.286  The Commissioner claimed that Kentucky 
state law prohibited such setoffs.287
All of the reinsurance contracts included broad arbitration 
clauses.
 
288  The British Aviation Insurance Company moved to compel 
arbitration abroad under Chapter 2 of the FAA, which implements the 
Convention.289  The Commissioner argued that Kentucky law prohibited 
compelling a liquidator to arbitrate, invalidated the arbitration clauses, 
and preempted the FAA and the Convention under the MFA.290
2. Holding 
 
The Second Circuit agreed with the Commissioner.291  It explained 
that the Supremacy Clause and rules of statutory construction would 
normally allow the FAA and Convention to preempt state law.292
 
 282. Id. at 42. 
  
However, the MFA protects state statutes “enacted ‘for the purpose of 
regulating the business of insurance’ from preemption and leaves the 
 283. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 304.33-010 (1994). 
 284. 66 F.3d at 42. 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. at 42-43. 
 287. Id. at 43. 
 288. Id. 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. The Kentucky Liquidation Act states: 
If there is a delinquency proceeding under this subtitle, the provisions of this 
subtitle shall govern those proceedings, and all conflicting contractual provisions 
contained in any contract between the insurer which is subject to the delinquency 
proceeding and any third party, including, but not limited to, the choice of law or 
arbitration provisions, shall be deemed subordinated to the provisions of this 
subtitle. 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.33-010(6) (1994). 
 291. 66 F.3d at 45. 
 292. Id. at 43. 
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regulation of the business of insurance to the states.”293  In a terse 
opinion, the court found that the FAA and the Convention do not 
specifically relate to the business of insurance under the Supreme 
Court’s three-part test for determining whether a particular practice 
constitutes the business of insurance.294  The court found that 
reinsurance practices are part of the business of insurance because 
“[a]ny transaction between an insurer and a reinsurer is principally the 
same as a transaction between an original policyholder and an insurer, as 
both center around the transfer of risk.”295  Furthermore, the court found 
that the Kentucky Liquidation Act regulates the business of insurance.296
The foreign reinsurance corporations argued that even if the 
Kentucky statute preempted the FAA, the Convention still requires 
arbitration of their claims because it trumps the state statute under the 
Supremacy Clause.
 
297  The court rejected this argument.298  It instead 
found that the Convention is non-self-executing and relies upon the 
FAA, which is an Act of Congress, for its implementation.299  Citing 
Foster v. Neilson, the Second Circuit reasoned that a treaty is not a 
legislative act, but instead a contract between two nations.300  It 
explained that a treaty is equivalent to a legislative act when it operates 
itself without any implementing legislation.301  The court concluded that 
the MFA allowed state law to reverse-preempt the Convention because 
the FAA, as the Convention’s implementing legislation, does not 
preempt the Kentucky statute.302  It further determined that the 
Convention itself does not apply.303
 
 293. Id. 
  The court therefore held that the 
Convention was reverse-preempted under the MFA by the Kentucky 
state law, which rendered the arbitration agreement between the parties 
 294. Id. at 44. 
 295. Id. 
 296. Id. at 44-45. 
 297. Id. at 45. 
 298. Id. 
 299. Id. 
 300. Id. 
 301. Id. 
 302. Id. 
 303. Reinsurance refers to the practice whereby primary insurers, who have assumed 
the risk from their policy holders in exchange for premiums, transfer portions of that 
risk to reinsurers in exchange for premiums pursuant to reinsurance agreements. Id. at 
42. Reinsurers then transfer portions of the assumed risk to their own reinsurers, thereby 
spreading the risk of one policyholder among a variety of insurers. Id. 
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unenforceable.304
III. A RESOLUTION IN FAVOR OF ARBITRATION 
 
 
This Part proposes a legislative and judicial solution to the split in 
authority over whether the MFA allows state law prohibiting arbitration 
agreements to reverse-preempt the Convention.  Part A suggests that 
Congress should incorporate an arbitration exemption into the MFA, 
providing that state law cannot reverse-preempt the Convention.  Part B 
suggests how the Supreme Court should interpret the MFA and the 
Convention to resolve the split in authority in favor of arbitration. 
A. LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION: PROPOSAL TO AMEND THE MFA 
Congress should amend the MFA to ensure the validity of 
arbitration agreements in international insurance contracts and protect 
the United States’ economic competitiveness.  The amendment should 
accommodate both insurers and states and strike an appropriate balance 
between their interests.  States have a recognized interest in continuing 
to regulate the insurance industry as they have done for over a 
century.305
 
 304. Id. at 45. 
  However, the international business community has an 
 305. See supra notes 31-38, 61-65 and accompanying text. Whether the MFA may 
reverse-preempt the FAA in the domestic context and the balance that Congress should 
strike between insurers and states in the domestic context is outside the scope of this 
Note.  Instead, this Note focuses on the delicate balance that Congress must strike 
between states and international insurers in the context of the Convention. Courts and 
commentators have debated on the extent to which the MFA should or should not 
reverse preempt the FAA. Compare, e.g., American Bankers Ins. Co. of Florida v. 
Inman, 436 F.3d 490, 494 (5th Cir. 2006) (finding that the MFA allowed a Mississippi 
statute, which prohibited arbitration of disputes regarding uninsured motorist and 
underinsured motorist coverage provisions of personal automobile insurance policies, to 
reverse-preempt the MFA, where an automobile insurer filed a motion to compel 
arbitration of an underinsured motorist coverage dispute) and National Home Ins. Co. v. 
King, 291 F. Supp. 2d 518, 530 (E.D. Ky. 2003) (finding that the MFA enabled a 
Kentucky statute, which invalidated arbitration clauses in insurance contracts, reverse-
preempted the FAA because the FAA did not specifically relate to the business of 
insurance) with Axa Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Infinity Financial Group, LLC, 608 F. 
Supp. 2d 1330, 1341 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (holding that Florida law did not reverse-preempt 
the FAA under the MFA and that the FAA applied to life insurer’s claims against 
insurance brokers for fraud, negligence, and disgorgement of commissions). 
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interest in being able to flexibly formulate their relationships, protect its 
expectations, and autonomously define dispute resolution mechanisms in 
its contracts.306
1. Drafting the Proposed Amendment 
  The MFA currently under-protects insurers’ interests 
and over-protects states’ interests.  Congress should therefore adopt an 
exemption to the reverse-preemption provision precluding state law 
from preempting international treaties concerning arbitration or other 
alternative dispute mechanisms. 
Congress should amend the MFA to protect commercial parties’ 
ability to effectively structure their transactions and employ efficient 
dispute resolution mechanisms.  It may accomplish this objective in one 
of two ways.  First, it may expressly exclude the Convention and other 
treaties concerning arbitration from being considered “Acts of 
Congress.”  Recognizing the unique importance of enforcing arbitration 
awards, Congress may adopt a provision and codify it in 15 U.S.C.A. § 
1012 (c), stating, “For the purposes of this Act, the Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards, codified at 9 U.S.C. 
§§ 201-208, and any other treaties calling for the enforcement or 
recognition of arbitration awards shall not be construed to be an Act of 
Congress subject to section (b).”  At minimum, the amending provision 
should exempt the Convention, stating in § 1012 (c), “Nothing contained 
in this chapter shall render the Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards, codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208, 
inapplicable to agreements entered into by commercial parties.” 
Congress may instead include a more wide-sweeping provision in 
section 1012 to clarify and narrowly define what constitutes “Acts of 
Congress” in subsection (b).  However, that possibility warrants further 
discussion outside the scope of this Note. 
Alternatively, Congress should append the exemption to section 
1014, which explains the MFA’s affect on other laws and currently 
exempts the National Labor Relations Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, 
and the Merchant Marine Act from reverse-preemption.307
 
 
  Congress 
should amend it to read as follows: 
 
 306. See supra notes 122-28 and accompanying text. 
 307. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1014 (West 2010). 
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§ 1014 Effect on other laws 
Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed to 
affect in any manner the application to the business of 
insurance of the Act of July 5, 1935, as amended, known as 
the National Labor Relations Act [29 U.S.C.A. 151 et seq.], 
or the Act of June 25, 1938, as amended, known as the Fair 
Labor Standards Act of 1938 [29 U.S.C.A. 201 et seq.], or 
the Act of June 5, 1920, known as the Merchant Marine 
Act, 1920, or the Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards, as implemented known as 
the Convention Act [9 U.S.C.A. § 201 et seq.]. 
Incorporating such an exemption to section 1014 may be more 
appropriate than appending it to section 1012 because section 1014 
currently contains exemptions for other statutes. 
2. Balancing Competing Interests 
Adopting an amendment to protect the Convention against reverse-
preemption will effectively balance the interests of states, insurers, and 
the federal government. 
a. Promoting International Commerce and Insurers’ Expectations 
An amendment exempting the Convention from the MFA’s reverse-
preemption provision would protect business parties’ expectations and 
promote international commerce.  The Convention embodies the 
international business community’s expectation that parties may settle 
any disputes arising from their transactions in a manner specified in their 
arbitration clauses.308  The ability of state law to reverse-preempt the 
Convention and invalidate mutually agreed upon arbitration clauses 
under the MFA poses risks for foreign insurers transacting business in 
the United States by jeopardizing their expectations.309  Both foreign 
commercial parties and their American counterparts are apprehensive of 
litigating in foreign court systems with different standards, procedures, 
and awards from those with which they are familiar.310
 
 308. See supra notes 122-29, 143-58 and accompanying text. 
  For instance, 
foreign parties often opt to include arbitration clauses in their contracts 
 309. See supra notes 3, 122-28 and accompanying text. 
 310. See supra notes 143-49. 
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because they generally fear a possible award of punitive damages by 
American courts,311 find the broad discovery procedures in American 
courts daunting,312 and harbor misgivings about the jury system.313
 
 311. See Michael F. Hoellering, International Arbitration Agreements: A Look 
Behind the Scenes, 53 DISP. RESOL. J. 64, 68 (1998) (“In revising the IAR, the AAA 
was mindful that many foreign parties often fear a possible award of punitive damages 
by American tribunals.”); Jimmie O. Clements, Jr., Limiting Punitive Damages: A 
Placebo For America’s Ailing Competitiveness, 24 ST. MARY’S L.J. 197 (1992); Kerry 
A. Jung, How Punitive Damage Awards Affect U.S. Businesses in the International 
Arena: the Northcon I v. Mansei Kogyo Co. Decision, 17 WIS. INT’L L.J. 489, 502 
(1999) (“There is a second use of arbitration clauses: to protect . . . against the 
possibility of punitive damages in an international relationship.”); Adam Liptak, 
Foreign Courts Wary of U.S. Punitive Damages, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2008, at A1; 
U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, The U.S. Litigation Environment and Foreign Direct 
Investment: Supporting U.S. Competitiveness By Reducing Legal Costs And 
Uncertainty, INVEST IN AMERICA (Oct. 2008), www.investamerica.gov. 
  They 
use arbitration clauses as a vehicle to transact business with American 
 312. John M. Clark & Erin E. Nulty, Depositions Of Foreign Party Witnesses, 
NATIONAL INSURANCE ATTORNEYS 2 (2008), available at 
www.nldhlaw.com/CM/Articles/FTD%20Article.pdf; Steven C. Nelson, Alternatives 
To Litigation Of International Disputes, 23 INT’L L. 187, 197 (1989); Gerald Aksen, 
The Need To Utilize International Arbitration, 17 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 11, 13 
(1984); 
ROBERT F. CHUSHMAN ET. AL., CONSTRUCTION LITIGATION: REPRESENTING THE OWNER 
297 (1995) (“American discovery practice is largely misunderstood in foreign nations 
and has been condemned as overbroad and unduly disruptive of normal business 
activities. Civil law countries (such as France and German) generally view gathering 
evidence as a function of the courts rather than the litigants.”); Reports on the World of 
the Special Commission on the Operation Of The Hague Convention on the Taking of 
Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, 17 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 1417, 
1427 (1978). 
 313. Juries In Business Lawsuits, BUSINESS EXCHANGE, 
http://bx.businessweek.com/juries-in-business-lawsuits/news/ (“Others view juries in 
civil cases as easily confused and manipulated, especially in big commercial 
disputes.”); George Kimball, Risk Allocation, Liability Limits and Disputes in 
Outsourcing, 1018 PLI/PAT 257, 297 (2010) (“[F]oreign companies have as many 
misgivings about U.S. juries as U.S. companies do about proceedings abroad.”); 
Richard E. Donovan, Explaining the U.S. Commercial Litigation System To Foreign 
Executives and Lawyers, THE METROPOLITAN CORPORATE COUNSEL 21 (Feb. 2004), 
available at  http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2004/February/21.pdf; Robert E. 
Litan, Through Their Eyes: How Foreign Investors View and React to the U.S. Legal 
System, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM 13 (Aug. 2007), available at 
www.instituteforlegalreform.com/get_ilr_doc.php?id=1059. 
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companies and eliminate such risks.314  In an arbitration setting, parties 
are free to agree on dispute resolution procedures and types of awards.315  
Indeed, Congress originally sought to mitigate business risks by 
federalizing arbitration law and adopting the Convention.316  By 
enabling parties to create mechanisms for dispute resolution through 
arbitration, parties avoid expenses associated with subjecting themselves 
to unfamiliar legal systems.317
 
 314. See supra note 3, 122-28 and accompanying text. 
  Therefore, insulating the Convention 
from the MFA will promote international business and serve the 
interests of both domestic and foreign insurers. 
 315. See Hoellering, supra note 311, at 67-68; Article 28(5) of the American 
Arbitration Association International Arbitration Rules (as amended and effective June 
1, 2009) (“Unless the parties agree otherwise, the parties expressly waive and forego 
any right to punitive, exemplary or similar damages unless a statute requires that 
compensatory damages be increased in a specified manner.”). 
 316. See supra Part I. 
 317. See, e.g., Omar T. Mohammedi, International Trade and Investment in Algeria: 
An Overview, 18 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 375, 407 (2010) (“Algeria’s enforcement of 
international arbitration clauses protects the rights of foreign investors who are 
unfamiliar with the Algerian legal system. It provides investors with the confidence that 
disputes will be judiciously heard and enforced.”); see also Erin E. Gleason, 
International Arbitral Appeals: What Are We So Afraid of?, 7 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 
269, 286 (2007) (“Traditionally, arbitration has been the favored means for settling 
international commercial disputes as it provides parties with the ability to bypass 
foreign legal systems, and the difficulties related to litigating in unfamiliar forums.”); 
Cindy G. Buys, The Arbitrators’ Duty To Respect The Parties’ Choice Of Law In 
Commercial Arbitration, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 59, 66 (2005) (“One of the primary 
incentives for parties to agree to arbitration in the international business context is to 
avoid being subjected to a potentially hostile foreign forum and an unfamiliar legal 
system.”); Rachel Engle, Note, Party Autonomy in International Arbitration: Where 
Uniformity Gives Way to Predictability, 15 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 323, 345 (2002) 
(“[M]ultinational corporation may seek arbitration as a means of avoiding the other 
country’s legal system, but also, it may seek arbitration in order to avoid being subject 
to provisions of unknown foreign law.”); Claudia T. Salomon et al., Arbitrator’s 
Disclosure Standards: The Uncertainty Continues, 63 DISP. RESOL. J. 76, 77 (2008); 
Claire Morel de Westgaver, Arbitration of Joint Venture Disputes (Jan. 8, 2008), 
available at 
http://www.twobirds.com/English/News/Articles/Pages/Arbitration_of_joint_venture_d
isputes.aspx; ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 99 (4th ed. 2004). 
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b. Maintaining Market Competitiveness 
Such an amendment is also likely to enhance the American 
market’s competitiveness and ability to attract foreign insurers.  The 
insurance industry has dramatically grown since Congress enacted the 
MFA.318  Like other industries, insurance has rapidly globalized over the 
past century, as foreign insurers created and entered new markets and 
domestic markets increasingly demand new and varied insurance 
products.319  Due to the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs 
(GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), foreign insurers are 
now even entering burgeoning markets in developing countries in Latin 
America, the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and Asia.320  Along with 
opportunities presented by globalization, the insurance community also 
faces increased risks, such as those posed by terrorism.321
 
 318. Shanil R. Vitarana, Are The Regulatory Frameworks in Asian Emerging 
Markets Equipped to Handle the Influx of Foreign Insurers?, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 207, 
209 (2006); Julia F. Chu, Milliman USA, The Makings of Imminent Insurance Markets 
in Asia (2001), available at http://www.milliman.com/pubs/InsuranceMktsAsia.pdf; see 
Swiss Re, Exploiting the Growth Potential of Emerging Insurance Markets-China and 
India in the Spotlight (2004), available at http://www.swissre.com. 
  The United 
States must keep pace with emerging markets by maintaining a 
competitive market that protects foreign insurers’ expectations and helps 
them reduce their risk in international transactions.  Enforcing 
arbitration agreements will help international parties reduce the risk 
inherent in their transactions and thereby maintain market 
competitiveness. 
 319. Vitarana, supra note 318, at 209. American International Group (AIG), the 
leading insurance firm in the world, has an international business network that includes 
China, Africa, Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East. See AIG, 
http://www.aigcorporate.com (last visited Nov. 10, 2010). 
 320. See Vitarana, supra note 318, at 209; Swiss Re, Exploiting the Growth 
Potential of Emerging Insurance Markets-China and India in the Spotlight (2004), 
http://www.swissre.com; W. Jean Kwon, Sch. of Risk Mgmt., St. John’s Univ., Toward 
Free Trade in Services: Emerging Insurance Markets in Asia (2001), http:// 
www.iisonline.org/pdf/W.pdf. 
 321. Elizabeth Pietanza, Winning the Risky Global Business Game: Parrying the 
Thrusts of Terrorism with an International Insurance Coalition, 34 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 
85 (2003) (explaining the impact of the 9/11 attacks on the globalization of the 
insurance industry). 
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c. Protecting States’ Rights 
In addition, exempting the Convention from the MFA would not 
unduly infringe upon states’ power to regulate the insurance industry 
because the Convention only focuses on dispute resolution mechanisms.  
Originally, Congress intended the MFA to insulate the insurance 
industry from federal antitrust law and preserve states’ right to regulate 
it.322  Application of the federal antitrust laws jeopardized several 
practices at the industry’s heart, such as rate-making and other customs 
that states had exclusively regulated.323  The Convention focuses on 
arbitration and does not regulate the business of insurance, but instead 
regulates general methods of handling contract disputes.324  It does not 
alter substantive remedies available under state law, but merely requires 
parties to seek state relief through arbitration instead of traditional 
litigation.325
 
 322. See supra notes 55-81 and accompanying text. 
  Indeed, the Convention and rules governing arbitration in 
general do not impact states’ ability to substantively regulate insurance 
practices or the industry’s structure.  States’ interest in regulating 
insurance therefore does not extend to arbitration or methods of seeking 
relief from contractual disputes arising from insurance agreements.  
Enforcing arbitration clauses under the Convention would thus not 
impair any state interest in regulating the operation of the insurance 
business. 
 323. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text. 
 324. See, e.g., Hart v. Orion Ins. Co., 453 F.2d 1358, 1360 (10th Cir.1971) (“None 
of the provisions of the Montana, Illinois, and Colorado statutes to which our attention 
has been called regulate the business of insurance. Instead, they are laws of general 
applicability pertaining to the method of handling contract disputes . . . Accordingly, the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act does not bar the application of the Federal Arbitration Act and 
the arbitration provisions are enforceable in the case at bar.”); Ainsworth v Allstate Ins. 
Co., 634 F Supp 52 (W.D. Mo. 1985); Hamilton Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Republic Nat’l 
Life Ins. Co., 408 F.2d 606, 611 (1969) (rejecting a McCarran Act challenge to an 
arbitration clause by concluding that arbitration statutes do not regulate the insurance 
business, but instead “regulat[e] the method of handling contract disputes generally”); 
Miller v. Nat’l Fid. Life Ins. Co., 588 F.2d 185, 187 (5th Cir.1979) (“The test under 
McCarran-Ferguson is not whether a state has enacted statutes regulating the business 
of insurance, but whether such state statutes will be invalidated, impaired, or 
superceded by application of federal law.”). 
 325. J. Maria Glover, Beyond Unconscionability: Class Action Waivers and 
Mandatory Arbitration Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1735, 1762 (2006) (“[T]he 
switch from a courtroom to an arbitral forum still leaves intact an effective alternative 
means of enforcing private rights.”). 
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d. Fulfilling Treaty Obligations 
Furthermore, Congress should enact this exemption to ensure that 
the United States fulfills its treaty obligations.  Nothing in the MFA’s 
legislative history suggests that Congress intended to allow state statutes 
to reverse-preempt treaties.326  The United States should strive to fulfill 
its treaty obligations in good faith.327  It ratified the Convention in 1958 
and is therefore under an international obligation to fulfill the treaty’s 
objective of enforcing arbitral awards arising from disputes involving 
international commercial agreements.328
e. Promoting Arbitration 
  Therefore, incorporating an 
exemption for the Convention into the MFA would help the United 
States satisfy its treaty obligations. 
Finally, insulating the Convention from reverse-preemption under 
the MFA furthers the objective of Congress and the courts to promote 
arbitration.  The Supreme Court has reiterated its policy of favoring and 
enforcing arbitration agreements throughout the past century.  Both the 
Court and Congress have recognized the benefits of arbitration in 
helping parties achieve quicker and more cost-effective results and in 
easing the already over-burdened court system.329
 
 326. See supra Part I.A.2. 
  The Court has also 
 327. See Edward T. Swaine, Taking Care of Treaties, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 388 
n.294 (2008) (“The President might yet try to construe U.S. statutory law in a manner 
consistent, if possible, with the results of dispute settlement process.”); Murray v. 
Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (explaining that that Acts 
of Congress “ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other 
possible construction remains”); F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 
155, 164 (2004) (reaffirming the Charming Betsy canon); Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U.S. 
433, 442 (1921) (“While the question of the construction of treaties is judicial in its 
nature, . . . courts when called upon to act should be careful to see that international 
engagements are faithfully kept and observed . . . .”); Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181, 184 
(1902) (explaining that treaties “should be faithfully observed, and interpreted with a 
view to fulfill our just obligations to other powers”); The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 
Wheat.) 1, 68 (1821) (emphasizing a principle of good faith related to the interpretation 
of treaties “which our Government could not violate without disgrace, and which [the 
Supreme] Court could not disregard without betraying its duty”); Hyundai Elecs. Co. v. 
United States, 53 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1343-44 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1999); NANDA & PANSIUS, 
2 LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES IN U.S. COURTS § 10:9 (2010). 
 328. See supra notes 138-42 and accompanying text. 
 329. See supra notes 138-42, 148-64, 184-90 and accompanying text. 
2011] ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL 655 
INSURERS’ EXPECTATIONS 
 
reiterated the federal nature of arbitration law and the importance of 
providing a robust uniform system of arbitration throughout the country, 
particularly to prevent forum shopping and to fulfill parties’ 
expectations.330  If some states prohibit arbitration agreements in 
insurance contracts and others allow it and the MFA allows anti-
arbitration state law to overtake the Convention, then parties are more 
likely to shop for a forum in which to raise their disputes according to 
whether or not they desire to enforce their arbitration agreement.331  In 
addition, the unavailability of arbitration and resulting litigation may 
make foreign commercial parties more reluctant to transact with 
American businesses in light of the increased risk of litigation in United 
States courts and thereby disadvantage American businesses.332
Therefore, in order to achieve an appropriate balance between the 
interests of the international business community, states, and federal 
  
Preventing state laws from invalidating arbitration agreements will thus 
further Congress’ goal to promote arbitration as a means of effective 
alternative dispute resolution. 
 
 330. See supra notes 184-94 and accompanying text. 
 331. See supra notes 144, 175 and accompanying text; Milo Molfa, Pathological 
Arbitration Clauses and the Conflict of Laws, 37 HONG KONG L. J. 161, 173 (2007); 
Lawrence Perlman & Steven C. Nelson, New Approaches to the Resolution of 
International Commercial Disputes, 17 INT’L LAW. 215, 218-25 (1983) (contending that 
arbitration reduces forum shopping, concurrent jurisdiction, and limited access to 
pretrial discovery inherent in international litigation). 
 332. See HOWARD M. HOLTZMANN & JOSEPH E. NEUHAUS , A GUIDE TO THE 
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2-4 (1989); 
see also Melissa Gerardi , Jumpstarting APEC In The Race To “Open Regionalism”: A 
proposal For The Multilateral Adoption Of UNCITRAL’s Model Law On International 
Commercial Arbitration, 15 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 668, 684 (1995) (“When business 
people are exposed to risk in an international business transaction due to the absence of 
effective dispute resolution procedures, they can undertake one of two responses. They 
can either 1) refrain from engaging in the transaction or 2) assume the risk by increasing 
the price of the transaction accordingly.”); Kenneth T. Ungar, The Enforcement of 
Arbitral Awards Under UNCITRAL’s Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration, 25 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 717, 717 (1987) (“The arbitral clause 
specifies the manner in which are the place where contracting parties are to settle any 
future disputes. It has been referred to as ‘an almost indispensable precondition to 
achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential to any international business 
transaction.’  If contracting parties contemplate a long-term business relationship 
together, mutual self-interest necessitates a quick and amiable settlement of any 
disputes between them through arbitration.”) (internal citations omitted); supra notes 
143-49. 
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government, Congress should adopt an amendment exempting the 
Convention from the MFA’s reverse-preemption provision. 
B. JUDICIAL SOLUTION: INTERPRETING THE STATUTE  
TO UPHOLD PARTIES’ EXPECTATIONS 
This Part suggests how the Supreme Court should interpret the 
MFA to resolve the split in authority over whether the statute allows 
anti-arbitration state law to reverse-preempt the Convention.333  Based 
on the MFA’s text and legislative history, the national policy favoring 
arbitration, and the United States’ treaty obligations, the Supreme Court 
should adopt the Fifth Circuit’s approach and hold that “Act of 
Congress” in section 1112 of the MFA does not encompass treaties such 
as the Convention.  The Supreme Court should recognize that Congress 
did not intend to include treaties within the scope of an “Act of 
Congress” and find that state law does not reverse-preempt implemented 
treaty provisions, whether self-executing or not.  The MFA’s text, 
legislative history, and purpose indicate that the Act does not apply to 
treaties or foreign commerce in general.334  In addition, the United Sates 
has a strong interest in satisfying its duties under the Convention and 
promoting arbitration as a means for commercial parties to effectively 
resolve their disputes.335  Finally, the status of the Convention as self-
executing or non-self-executing is immaterial because it nevertheless 
remains a treaty in federal law under the doctrine of preemption.336
1. The Plain Meaning of “Act of Congress” 
 
The Fifth Circuit appropriately found that the plain meaning of 
“Act of Congress” did not include treaties but instead only contemplated 
legislation when Congress originally enacted the MFA.  Before 
Congress drafted the MFA, the Supreme Court distinguished between 
Acts of Congress and treaties.337
 
 333. The Supreme Court recently denied a petition for writ of certiorari and declined 
to hear a case that may have resolved the split in authority. Safety National, 79 
U.S.L.W. 3195 (2010). 
  For instance, in Missouri v. Holland, 
 334. See infra notes 363-86 and accompanying text. 
 335. See supra notes 138-42, 148-64, 184-90 and accompanying text. 
 336. See infra notes 341-61 and accompanying text. 
 337. Michael P. Van Alstine, The Death of Good Faith in Treaty Jurisprudence and 
a Call For Resurrection, 93 GEO. L.J. 1885 (2005) (explaining the fundamental 
2011] ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL 657 
INSURERS’ EXPECTATIONS 
 
the Supreme Court recognized that a treaty only has domestic effect 
through Congress’ enactment of implementing legislation.338  However, 
the Court drew a distinction between treaties and Acts of Congress, 
explaining that even if Congress could not accomplish a particular 
objective through a general “Act of Congress,” it could achieve the same 
goal through a treaty.339  Likewise, both earlier and subsequent decisions 
of the Supreme Court have distinguished treaties from Acts of 
Congress.340  Statutes have also referenced treaties as a distinct category 
from congressional Acts.341  Here, for instance, the Convention’s 
implementing legislation explicitly provides that the “Convention . . . 
shall be enforced in United States courts . . . .”342  The Convention Act 
itself refers to Acts of Congress and treaties separately, stating that “[a]n 
action or proceeding falling under the Convention shall be deemed to 
arise under the laws and treaties of the United States.”343
2. “Act of Congress” in the MFA’s Legislative History 
  Therefore, the 
Supreme Court should hold that treaties do not constitute “Acts of 
Congress” covered by the MFA and find that the Convention preempts 
anti-arbitration state statutes. 
The Fifth Circuit properly noted that the MFA’s legislative history 
 
distinction between treaties and statutes). 
 338. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 443 (1920). 
 339. Id. at 432-33 (upholding constitutionality of Migratory Bird Act and associated 
treaty). 
 340. Moser v. United States, 341 U.S. 41, 45 (1951) (“[A] treaty may be modified 
by a subsequent act of Congress . . . .”); Higueras v. United States, 72 U.S. 827, 830 
(1864) (“[T]here can be no doubt that the several documents are sufficient to give to the 
donee an inchoate right to the tract, within the meaning of the treaty of cession and the 
act of Congress subsequently passed to carry the provisions of the treaty into effect.”); 
Frevall v. Bache, 39 U.S. 95 (1840) (“There is a difference in the words used in the 
Treaty and Act of Congress”); Daniel Cordalis, The Effects of Climate Change on 
American Indian And Alaska Native Tribes, 22 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 45, 45 (2010) 
(“Tribes retain inherent sovereign powers that predate the formation of the United 
States and which are recognized in a complex body of federal law that includes treaties, 
acts of Congress, executive branch policies and regulations, and federal court 
decisions.”). 
 341. See, e.g., Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 461 (defining reservation 
“created or set apart by treaty or agreement with the Indians, Act of Congress, 
Executive order, purchase or otherwise”). 
 342. 9 U.S.C.A. § 201 (1970). 
 343. 9 U.S.C.A. § 203 (1970). 
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reflects that “Act of Congress” does not contemplate treaties.  In 
discussing the meaning of Section 2(b), Senator Ferguson stated: 
I think an explanation of paragraph (b) of section 2 should be made 
at this time. The purpose of that provision is very clear, that 
Congress did not want at the present time to take upon itself the 
responsibility of interfering with the taxation of insurance or the 
regulation of insurance by the States. . . .  If there is on the books of 
the United States a legislative act which relates to interstate 
commerce, if the act does not specifically relate to insurance, it 
would not apply at the present time. Having passed the bill now 
before the Senate, if Congress should tomorrow pass a law relating 
to interstate commerce, and should not specifically apply the law to 
the business of insurance, it would not be an implied repeal of this 
bill, and this bill would not be affected, because the Congress had 
not, under subdivision (b), said that the new law specifically applied 
to insurance.344
In other words, Senator Ferguson explained that “Act of Congress” 
is a “legislative act” passed by Congress.  In addition, nothing suggests 
that Congress intended to surrender its power to implement treaties that 
tangentially affect insurance to the MFA’s reverse-preemption 
provision.
 
345
3. Irrelevance of the Convention’s Executing Status 
 The MFA’s legislative history thereby suggests that Acts of 
Congress do no include treaties such as the Convention. 
The current status of the Convention as executing and non-self-
executing remains unknown, but is irrelevant for this analysis because 
treaties as a category distinct from Acts of Congress include both non-
self-executing and self-executing treaties.  The Second Circuit erred in 
 
 344. 91 CONG. REC. 481 (1945). During the same colloquy, Senator Ferguson made 
two other statements concerning the meaning of section 2(b). “[Section 2(b)] provides 
that no Federal legislation relating to interstate commerce shall by implication repeal 
any existing State law unless such act of Congress specifically so provides.” Id. at 483. 
“In other words, the case before the Supreme Court (SEUA) was a case applying the 
Sherman Act and the Clayton Act. We wanted to have the Clayton Act and the Sherman 
Act apply to insurance, but we did not want to go back into all the laws which had been 
enacted respecting interstate commerce and apply them to the business of insurance.” 
Id. at 486. Senator Revercomb, also a member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, made 
a statement to the same effect during the same debate. See id. at 485. 
 345. See supra notes 33-88 and accompanying text. 
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summarily characterizing the Convention as non-self-executing.  
Determining whether a treaty is self-executing requires a complex 
analysis.  In its terse opinion, the Court concluded that the Convention 
was non-self-executing because it “relies upon an Act of Congress for its 
implementation.”346  However, the Court failed to explain how the 
Convention “relies upon an Act of Congress.”347  It simply cited Foster 
v. Neilson for the proposition that a treaty is self-executing “whenever it 
operates of itself, without the aid of any legislative provision.”348  The 
Court’s analysis is deficient and tautological in that it explains that the 
treaty is non-self-executing because the treaty relies on an Act of 
Congress, which is the definition of non-self-execution.349  In addition, 
the Second Circuit oversimplified the analysis courts employ in 
determining whether a treaty “relies upon” legislation for its 
implementation.  As the Fifth Circuit properly noted, the fact that 
Congress adjusted United States law to fulfill its international 
obligations or the mere existence of implementing legislation alone is 
insufficient to indicate whether a treaty such as the Convention is self-
executing.350  Because the analysis for determining whether a treaty is 
self-executing is complicated, Congress often passes legislation to 
implement a treaty as a precaution to ensure the treaty’s effectiveness in 
United States law.351  The Second Circuit provides no other reasons to 
support its conclusion that the Convention is non-self-executing.352
Subsequent to the Second Circuit’s decision, the Supreme Court 
provided courts with more precise guidance on how to determine 
whether a treaty is self-executing in Medellin.
 
353  Under this framework, 
courts must “interpret a treaty like interpret[ing]a statute, begin[ing] 
with its text[t].”354 Using the Medellin analysis, however, the treaty’s 
text and legislative history both present equally compelling but opposing 
arguments for the Convention’s status.355
 
 346. Stephens v. Am. Int’l Ins. Co., 66 F.3d 41, 45 (2nd Cir. 1995). 
  As the concurrence in Safety 
 347. Id. 
 348. Id. (citing Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 313-14 (1829)). 
 349. Id. 
 350. Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 587 F.3d 
714, 714 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 351. Murphy, supra note 54, at 1552. 
 352. See Stephens v. Am. Int’l Ins. Co., 66 F.3d 41, 45 (2nd Cir. 1995). 
 353. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008). 
 354. Id. at 506. 
 355. Id. 
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National emphasizes,356 the treaty’s text in Article II contains mandatory 
language that indicates the provision is self-executing, explicitly 
directing domestic courts to enforce arbitration rights by referring the 
parties to arbitration.357  Alternatively, the Convention’s legislative 
history indicates that it may be non-self-executing or contain some non-
self-executing provisions because the Senate consented to the treaty in 
1968 but the United States did not accede to it until 1970 after Congress 
enacted implementing legislation.358
The Supreme Court should instead follow the Fifth Circuit in 
holding that the Convention’s status as self-executing or non-self-
executing is irrelevant in determining whether it is an Act of Congress 
under the MFA because neither non-self-executing nor self-executing 
treaties constitute Acts of Congress.  Implementing legislation that does 
not conflict with a treaty does not displace or substitute it in the 
hierarchy of preemption law. 
  The Convention’s status therefore 
still remains unclear. 
359  Regardless of its categorization, a 
treaty remains an international agreement negotiated by the Executive 
Branch and ratified by the Senate.360  Congress’ implementation of a 
treaty does not supplant the treaty or transform it into an “Act of 
Congress.”361
 
 356. Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 587 F.3d 
714, 752 (5th Cir. 2009). 
  Furthermore, Congress did not distinguish between self-
 357. See New York Convention, supra note 5, art. II. 
 358. 134 CONG. REC. S6700-01 (daily ed. May 26, 1988) (citing RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 487 (1987)); see Federal Judiciary Oversight: 
Protecting Small Business: Testimony on H.R. 3578 Before the H. Judiciary Comm., 
Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Prop., 1998 WL 307174 (F.D.C.H.) (statement of 
Jeffrey D. Kovar, Assistant legal Advisor, Office of the Legal Advisor, Department of 
State) (“To implement this requirement, Congress amended the Federal Arbitration Act, 
9 U.S.C. §§ 101-307, to add language that expressly provides that the New York 
Convention ‘shall be enforced in United States courts.’”); see also Leonard V. Quigley, 
Accession by the United States to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE L.J. 1049, 1070 (1961). 
 359. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall have Power, by and 
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the 
Senators present concur . . . .”). 
 360. See id. 
 361. See Michael P. Van Alstine, Federal Common Law in an Age of Treaties, 89 
CORNELL L. REV. 892, 922–24 (2004) (maintaining that Acts of Congress do not 
necessarily impact treaties’ status or relevance in US law); see also infra note 363 and 
accompanying text. 
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executing treaties and implemented but non-self-executing treaties when 
using the term “treaty” in various statutes contemporary with the 
MFA.362  Restricting the term “treaty” to self-executing treaties would 
be impractical because categorizing a treaty is often difficult and 
requires judicial interpretation.363  To further complicate the analysis, 
single treaties may contain both self-executing and non-self-executing 
provisions.364  In addition, self-executing and implemented but non-self-
executing treaties occupy the same status in preemption hierarchy. 365
 
 362. See Revenue Act of 1941, Pub.L. No. 77-250 § 109, 55 Stat. 687, 695 (1941) 
(amending certain provisions of the Internal Revenue Code to exclude the application of 
those sections to residents of certain countries “so long as there is in effect with such 
country a treaty which provides otherwise”); Farm Labor Supply Appropriation Act, 
Pub.L. No. 78-229 § 3, 58 Stat. 11, 13 (1944) (authorizing the War Food Administrator 
to enter into agreements with agricultural extension services of State colleges to furnish 
certain services to domestic interstate and foreign agricultural workers and to “require 
the modification or termination of any agreement with any such extension service 
whenever he finds such action to be necessary in order to carry out the terms of any 
treaty or international agreement to which the United States of America is signatory”). 
  
 363. See Natsu Taylor Saito, The Plenary Power Doctrine: Subverting Human 
Rights in the Name of Sovereignty, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 427, 468 n.255 (2002) (“It 
is difficult to tell which treaties will be declared non-self-executing.”); Murphy, supra 
note 54, at 1552 (“The self-executing determination, however, is complicated and 
nuanced, and Congress will often bypass any chance of doubt concerning the force of a 
treaty by enacting implementing legislation.”). Compare United States v. Percheman, 
32 U.S. 51, 89 (1833) (declaring a treaty to be self-executing) with Foster v. Neilson, 27 
U.S. 253, 314 (1829) (declaring the same treaty to be non-self-executing). 
 364. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 
111 cmt. h (1986) (“Some provisions of an international agreement may be self-
executing and others non-self-executing.”); see also United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 
862, 884 n.35 (5th Cir.1979) (“A treaty need not be wholly self-executory or wholly 
executory.”).  Sometimes, select provisions of treaties will be determined to be self-
executing or non-self-executing. See Warren v. United States, 340 U.S. 523, 526 n.2 
(1951); Lidas, Inc. v. U.S., 238 F.3d 1076, 1079–81 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 533 
U.S. 903 (2001) (“[I]t is far from uncommon for a treaty to contain both self-executing 
and non-self-executing provisions.”); United States v. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. 791, 797 
n.8 (S.D. Fla.1992) (holding that some provisions of the Geneva Convention Relative to 
the Treatment of Prisoners of War are self-executing while others are not); Fujii v. 
State, 242 P.2d 617, 619-21 (Cal. 1952); LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 203 (1996); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Treaty-Based 
Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1117-18 (1992) 
(contending that parts of the Constitution may be both self-executing and non-self-
executing). 
 365. See HENKIN, supra note 364, at 203-04; Brenton T. Culpepper, Missed 
Opportunity: Congress’s Attempted Response to the World’s Demand for the Violence 
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Congress and the courts do not treat them differently after 
implementation.366
Even if the Supreme Court finds that the MFA applies to the 
Convention and the Convention is non-self-executing, the Supreme 
Court should still prevent state anti-arbitration statutes from reverse-
preempting the Convention under the MFA because the “last in time 
rule” of foreign relations law dictates that the Convention must 
  The Supreme Court should therefore recognize that 
a treaty’s status as self-executing or non-self-executing does not bear on 
the distinction between treaties and Acts of Congress.  Therefore, 
regardless of whether the Convention is self-executing, the Supreme 
Court should recognize that it is not an “Act of Congress” subject to the 
MFA’s reverse-preemption provision. 
 
Against Women Act, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 733, 751 (2010) (“[B]oth self-
executing and non-self-executing treaties are U.S. law upon ratification.”); Martin S. 
Flaherty, History Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original Understanding, and Treaties 
as “Supreme Law of the Land,” 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2095, 2095 (1999); Yuji Iwasawa, 
The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties in the United States: A Critical Analysis, 26 
VA. J. INT’L L. 627, 631 (1986); Virginia H. Johnson, Application of the Rational Basis 
Test to Treaty-Implementing Legislation: The Need for a More Stringent Standard of 
Review, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 347, 347-51, 349 n.5 (2001) (“Whether self-executing or 
non-self-executing, the Supremacy Clause renders all treaties ‘the Law of the Land . . . 
.’ [P]er the Supremacy Clause, virtually all treaties should be interpreted as self-
executing.”).See generally Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 
760 (1988); Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott, The Scope of U.S. Senate 
Control Over the Conclusion and Operation of Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
571(1992); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2154 
(1999). But see Susanna Y. Chung, Prison Overcrowding: Standards In Determining 
Eighth Amendment Violations, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2351, 2381 (2000) (“[B]oth self-
executing and non-self-executing--are considered to be the supreme law of the land.”); 
John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the 
Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 2091-93 (1999) (propounding an 
unpopular view that the Framers intended non-self-executing treaties to be a limitation 
on treaty power); John C. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and 
Structural Defense of Non-Self-Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2218 (1999). The 
doctrine of pacta sunt servanda requires the United States to implement non-self-
executing treaties in good faith. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 
23, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 679, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. The Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties requires Congress to enact legislation implementing treaty obligations stating 
that “[a] party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its 
failure to perform a treaty.” Id. art. 27. “Both self-executing and non-self-executing 
treaties are made via explicit action by the political branches.” Derek Jinks & Neal 
Kumar Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1230, 1261 (2007). 
 366. Supra note 365. 
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supersede the MFA.  “Where a treaty and an act of Congress are wholly 
inconsistent with each other and the two cannot be reconciled, the courts 
have held that the one later in point of time must prevail.”367
4. The Distinction Between Foreign Commerce  
and Interstate Commerce 
  Here, 
Congress implemented the Convention in 1970, twenty-five years after it 
passed MFA.  Therefore, because the MFA preceded the Convention, 
the Supreme Court should recognize that the Convention prevails over 
the MFA. 
The Supreme Court should also recognize that the MFA does not 
cover the Convention as an “Act of Congress” because the MFA only 
applies to interstate commerce and does not apply to international 
arbitration agreements under the Convention.  As properly noted by 
several district courts, the MFA only removed domestic Commerce 
Clause restrictions from states’ power to tax and regulate the insurance 
business, not Foreign Commerce Clause limitations.368
The MFA’s text suggests that its preemptive effect is limited to 
interstate commerce.  It provides that states can exclusively regulate the 
substantive content of insurance contracts.
  The MFA’s text 
and legislative history along with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
its preemptive effect strongly indicate that the Act only applies to 
interstate commerce. 
369  As explained below, 
legislative history suggests that Congress envisioned the substantive 
content of insurance contracts as only relating to interstate not foreign 
commerce.370
Several district courts properly noted that the Act’s legislative 
history indicates that Congress did not intend the MFA to regulate 
foreign commerce, but instead only intended it to apply to interstate 
commerce.
  Therefore, the Act does not apply to international 
insurance contracts. 
371
 
 367. HENKIN, supra note 364, at 222; See also Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S. 310 
(1914); Chae Chan Ping v. United States 130 U.S. 581 (1889); The Cherokee Tobacco, 
78 U.S. 616 (1871). 
  While discussing the bill, the Senate continuously 
 368. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 369. 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (b). 
 370. See supra notes 341-61 and accompanying text. 
 371. See supra Part II.A.2. 
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referred to the “business of insurance” as “interstate” commerce.372  In 
discussing the purpose of section 2(b) of the Act, Senator Ferguson 
stated, “What we have in mind is that the insurance business, being 
interstate commerce, if we merely enact a law relating to interstate 
commerce, or if there is a law now on the statute books relating in some 
way to interstate commerce, it would not apply to insurance.”373
The Act’s principal drafter, Senator Ferguson, thereby defined “the 
business of insurance” as interstate commerce.  Furthermore, in 
discussing S.E.U.A., Senator Pepper emphasized that the Supreme Court 
recognized insurance as “interstate commerce within the meaning of the 
commerce clause of the Constitution.”
 
374  In addition, Senator Pepper 
asked Senator McCarran whether “states can regulate the business of 
insurance in a way inconsistent with the Sherman Act,” and Senator 
McCarran responded that “[i]f they do it, they do it at their own hazard . 
. . .[because] Congress has always had the power over interstate 
commerce.”375
I then expressed myself as believing . . . that insurance was interstate 
commerce; for I have always believed that a policy of insurance 
issued in the city of New York and sent to Kentucky or to San 
Francisco is just as much interstate commerce as is a certificate of 
stock issued in New York and sent to Kentucky or San Francisco or 
any other State.
  Furthermore, Senator Barkley also explained he believed 
that “insurance was interstate commerce,” stating, 
376
He further emphasized, “[W]e can enact such legislation as we may 
deem proper and wise to have enacted in connection with the regulation 
of this business, which clearly is interstate commerce.”
 
377
While the senators continuously described the “business of 
  The 
legislative history thereby contains numerous references to the “business 
of insurance” as interstate commerce. 
 
 372. 91 CONG. REC. 1471-1488 (1945). 
 373. Id. at 1487 (statement of Sen. Ferguson); see also United States Dep’t of 
Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 508 n.7 (1993) (quoting 91 CONG. REC. 1487 (daily ed. 
Feb. 27, 1945) (statement of Sen. Ferguson)) (emphasis added); Stephens v. Nat’l 
Distillers & Chem. Corp., 69 F.3d 1226, 1231 n.5 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting 91 CONG. 
REC. 1487 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1945) (statement of Sen. Ferguson)). 
 374. 91 CONG. REC. 1477 (1945) (statement of Sen. Pepper). 
 375. Id. at 1478 (statement of Sen. McCarran) (emphasis added). 
 376. Id. at 1487 (statement of Sen. Barkley). 
 377. Id. at 1488 (statement of Sen. Barkley) (emphasis added). 
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insurance” under the MFA as interstate commerce, the legislative record 
is devoid of any mention of foreign or international commerce with 
respect to the “business of insurance.”  Alternatively, a statement by 
Senator O’Mahoney explicitly suggests that the Senate did not intend the 
Act to apply to foreign commerce.  While discussing the bill’s proposed 
moratorium on federal antitrust law, Senator O’Mahoney stated, 
[T]here is not a line or sentence in the proposed act, as I have read it, 
would delegate to any State the power to legislate in the field of . . . 
foreign commerce.  State regulation must be for the State and not for 
the United States.  The bill does not sacrifice the power of Congress 
to regulate in the field of interstate commerce, but wisely . . . 
undertakes to say in effect to the State, ‘For this period, take the 
responsibility and regulate in the interest of the public.’378
Because the legislative history contains numerous references to the 
business of insurance as interstate commerce, the Supreme Court should 
hold that the Act does not apply to foreign commerce. 
 
Finally, subsequent Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Act 
and its legislative history strongly indicate that the MFA only applies to 
interstate commerce.  In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Ward, the 
Court held that the MFA’s reverse-preemptive effect only “exempts the 
insurance industry from Commerce Clause restrictions.”379  The 
Supreme Court found that the Act does not preempt the application of 
the Constitution and other federal laws beyond the interstate commerce 
limitation.380  Here, Congress derived the power to regulate international 
arbitration agreements and implement the Convention under the Foreign 
Commerce Clause, which empowers Congress “[t]o regulate Commerce 
with foreign Nations . . .”381  The Convention called for the enforcement 
of arbitration agreements in transactions involving commerce and 
contracts performance abroad.382
 
 378. Id. at 1483. 
  The Convention was also negotiated 
 379. 470 U.S. 869, 880 (1985). 
 380. Id. 
 381. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 382. Lander Co. v. MMP Invs., Inc., 107 F.3d 476 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he statute is 
comfortably within Congress’s commerce power.”). Article I(3) requires a country “on 
the basis of reciprocity [to] declare that it will apply the Convention to the recognition 
and enforcement of awards made only in the territory of another Contracting State.” 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
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under the Treaty power.383  The Foreign Commerce Clause and Treaty 
power are distinct from Congress’ power to regulate commerce “among 
the several states” domestically.384
The relationship between the MFA and the Convention is analogous 
to the relationship between the MFA and the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunity Act “FSIA”, which courts have found to be exempt from the 
MFA’s reverse-preemptive effect.  The FSIA regulates commerce with 
foreign nations and establishes rules governing the use of federal courts 
to adjudicate conflicts involving foreign sovereigns.
  Therefore, the Supreme Court’s 
precedent establishes that the MFA’s reverse-preemption provision is 
limited to interstate commerce. 
385  It provides that 
“a foreign state shall be immune from attachment, arrest and 
execution.”386  In Moore v. National Distillers & Chemical 
Corporation,387 a federal magistrate judge in the Southern District of 
New York held that the FSIA preempted section 1213(c)(1) because the 
Act exempts the business of insurance only from commerce clause 
limitations.  The Second Circuit and Southern District of New York later 
affirmed the magistrate’s order and re-asserted the interstate commerce 
clause limitation of the MFA reverse-preemption provision.388  The New 
York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, also found that the FSIA 
preempted the MFA and recognized the interstate commerce clause 
limitation, stating, “(i)n enacting the FSIA, ‘Congress expressly 
exercised its power to regulate foreign commerce, along with other 
specified Art. I powers(.)”‘389
 
 383. In re Sedco, Inc., 767 F.2d 1140, 1145 (5th Cir 1985) (“The Convention was 
negotiated pursuant to the Constitution’s Treaty power. Congress then adopted enabling 
legislation to make the Convention the highest law of the land. As such, the Convention 
must be enforced according to its terms over all prior inconsistent rules of law.”). 
  The state court further found that the 
 384. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 385. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 
2891, 2898 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(a), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1994)); Verlinden 
B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 496 (1983); Stephens v. Nat’l Distillers 
& Chem. Corp., 69 F.3d 1226, 1231 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 386. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 90 Stat. at 2898. 
 387. 143 F.R.D. 526, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff’d sub nom., Stephens v. Nat’l 
Distillers & Chem. Corp., 69 F.3d 1226 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 388. Stephens v. Nat’l Distillers & Chem. Corp., No. 91 CIV 2901, 1993 WL 
228851, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 1993). 
 389. Moore v. Aegon Reinsurance Co. of America, 196 A.D.2d 250, 261 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1994), cert. dismissed sub nom., Stephens v. Instituto de Resseguros do Brasil 
(IRB), 512 U.S. 1283 (1994) (citing Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 
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federal magistrate judge properly concluded that “[i]n view of the 
paramount importance of the U.S. foreign policy concerns embodied in 
the FSIA . . . the preemptive effect of the McCarran-Ferguson Act does 
not extend to the FSIA.”390 Similarly, here, in implementing the 
Convention, Congress exercised its power to regulate foreign commerce, 
as distinct from interstate commerce.391
Therefore, based on the MFA’s text, legislative history, and 
subsequent interpretations of the Act, the Supreme Court should 
recognize that the MFA is limited to Commerce Clause-based 
legislation.  The Court should thus hold that the MFA does not allow 
state law to reverse-preempt the Convention because the Act only 
applies to domestic interstate commerce and not foreign commerce. 
  As other courts have found that 
the MFA does not allow state law to preempt the FSIA, the Supreme 
Court should hold the MFA does not enable anti-arbitration state law to 
reverse-preempt the Convention. 
5. The MFA’s Purpose of Restoring the Pre-S.E.U.A. Status Quo 
Furthermore, Congress did not intend the MFA’s reverse-
preemption provision to apply to arbitration or dispute resolution 
because in enacting the MFA, Congress sought to restore the insurance 
industry to its pre-S.E.U.A. state, which included being subject to federal 
arbitration law.  In SEC v. National Securities, Inc., the Supreme Court 
explained that “[t]he McCarran-Ferguson Act was an attempt to turn 
back the clock, to assure that the activities of insurance companies in 
dealing with their policyholders would remain subject to state 
regulation.”392  Congress sought to “restore to the States’ broad authority 
to tax and regulate the insurance industry,”393 but did not define the 
“business of insurance” or “regulation.”394
 
U.S. 480, 496 (1983)). 
  To illuminate the meaning of 
these phrases, one must refer to the history behind the Act, including 
legislative history along with the general history of federal and state 
 390. Id. 
 391. See supra notes 360-74 and accompanying text. 
 392. 393 U.S. 453, 568 (1969). 
 393. United States Dep’t of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 507 (1993). 
 394. See 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1994); see also Raymond A Guenter, Rediscovering the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act’s Commerce Clause Limitation, 6 CONN. INS. L.J. 253, 297 
(2000). 
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regulation of insurance.395
Nothing in the MFA’s text or legislative history suggests that the 
reverse-preemption provision encompasses methods of alternative 
dispute resolution such as arbitration, but instead indicates that the 
provision targeted areas of law that would substantively impact the 
insurance industry’s practices.  The legislative history primarily focuses 
on the Act’s impact on trade regulation.
 
396  Nearly all of the floor 
debates and amendments made to the legislation related to the extent to 
which the MFA would allow state law to insulate the insurance business 
from federal antitrust law.397  The hearings398 and committee reports399
The expressed purpose of the MFA further confirms that it does not 
apply to arbitration law.  House Reports on S. 340 indicate that Congress 
did not enact the statute to provide the states with limitless authority 
over the insurance business, but instead intended to maintain the status 
quo of the regulatory system before S.E.U.A. disrupted the industry.
 
similarly focused on antitrust.  Therefore, the MFA’s legislative history 
suggests that Congress was primarily concerned with preventing federal 
law from substantively altering the practices and structure of the 
insurance industry, not its methods of dispute resolution. 
400
It is not the intention of Congress in the enactment of this legislation 
to clothe the States with any power to regulate or tax the business of 
insurance beyond that which they had been held to possess prior to 
the decision in the Southeastern Underwriters Association case. 
Briefly, your Committee is of the opinion that we should provide for 
the continued regulation and taxation of insurance by the States, 
subject always, however, to the limitations set out in the controlling 
decisions of the Supreme Court, as, for instance, in Allgeyer v. 
Louisiana (165 U.S. 578), St. Louis Cotton Compress Co. v 
Arkansas (260 U.S. 346) and Connecticut General Insurance Co. v. 
  
The House stated, 
 
 395. Guenter, supra note 394, at 297. 
 396. See supra Part I.B. 
 397. See 91 CONG. REC. 478-88, 1477-88 (1945) (statement of Rep. Russell); 90 
CONG. REC. 6551-56, A 3020 (1944) (statement of Rep. Walter); Guenter, supra note 
394, at 297. 
 398. Judiciary Committee Hearings on S. 1362, H.R. 3269 and H.R. 3270 Before the 
Committees on the Judiciary, 78th Cong. 25, 2-8, 31-65 (1943) (statements of Sen. 
Josiah W. Bailey & Att’y Gen. Francis Biddle). 
 399. See H.R. REP. NO. 79-143, at 2-3 (1945); S. REP. NO. 79-20, at 1-2 (1945); S. 
REP. No. 78-1112 at 2-6 (1944); H.R. REP. NO. 78-873, at 1-8 (1943). 
 400. Guenter, supra note 394, at 297; H.R. REP. NO. 79-143, at 3 (1945). 
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Johnson (303 U.S. 77) (which hold, inter alia, that a State does not 
have the power to tax contracts of insurance or reinsurance entered 
into outside of its jurisdiction by individuals or corporations resident 
or domiciled therein covering risks within the State or to regulate 
such transactions in any way).401
Senator McCarran read the statement into the record before the 
Senate voted on the final version of S. 340, and then stated: “In other 
words, we give to the states no more powers than those they previously 
had, and we take none from them.”
 
402  These illuminating statements 
indicate that Congress did not intend to surrender any power that it 
wielded before the S.E.U.A. decision.403  The Federal Arbitration Act 
was passed in 1923 and predates the MFA, enacted in 1945.  By the time 
the Supreme Court decided S.E.U.A. and Congress deliberated over the 
MFA, the FAA had already established that arbitration law was 
primarily federal.404  The FAA contained no exemption for the insurance 
industry.405
6. Policy Implications 
  The states thus did not “possess” the power to exclusively 
regulate arbitration in the insurance industry prior to S.E.U.A., but 
instead shared that power with the federal government.  Therefore, 
because Congress expressed that it did not seek to provide states with 
any power to regulate the insurance industry beyond that which it 
already enjoyed prior to the S.E.U.A. decision and the FAA’s 
federalization of arbitration occurred before the decision, the Supreme 
Court should recognize that MFA’s reverse-preemption provision does 
not include arbitration law and Congress did not intend states’ 
“regulation” to encompass arbitration.  The stated purpose for the Act— 
returning the insurance industry to its status quo— may be accomplished 
without reverse-preempting the Convention or the FAA. 
This resolution would enable the United States to both promote its 
national policy favoring arbitration and fulfill its international 
 
 401. See State Bd. of Ins. v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 370 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1962) 
(relying on this report, the Court determined that Congress intended that the Court’s 
pre-SEUA decisions would continue to control the authority of the states to tax foreign 
insurance companies). 
 402. 91 CONG. REC. 1442 (1945) (emphasis added). 
 403. See Guenter, supra note 394. 
 404. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2006). 
 405. Id. 
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obligations under the Convention. 
a. National Policy Favoring Arbitration 
Recognizing that the Convention is not subject to the MFA’s 
reverse-preemption provision will promote the United States’ national 
policy favoring arbitration.  As explained above,406 the Supreme Court 
has recognized that the federal policy favoring arbitration “applies with 
special force in the field of international commerce.”407  The United 
States adopted the Convention “to encourage the recognition and 
enforcement of commercial arbitration agreements in international 
contracts and to unify the standards by which agreements to arbitrate are 
observed and arbitral awards are enforced in the signatory countries.”408  
Commercial parties transacting business among countries with different 
legal traditions particularly find arbitration clauses helpful to facilitate 
their relationships.409  A neutral third-party forum resolves any dispute 
that arises “free from the biases of local courts and the vagaries of an 
unresponsive judiciary.”410
b. Fulfilling International Treaty Obligations 
  Here, preventing states from nullifying 
arbitration clauses in international insurance contracts will promote 
arbitration in international commerce by respecting and upholding the 
agreements of commercial parties transacting globally.  Therefore, 
excluding the Convention from the MFA’s reverse-preemption provision 
would align with century-long federal policy favoring arbitration. 
The United States should ensure that anti-arbitration state law does 
not reverse-preempt the Convention to fulfill its international 
obligations.  The Convention’s effectiveness depends upon its 
signatories’ commitment to ensuring that their domestic courts enforce 
arbitration clauses and awards.411
 
 406. See Part III.A. 
  When a signatory nation thwarts 
parties’ abilities to enforce awards, commercial parties find themselves 
unable to achieve justice, collect their remedies, and effectively do 
 407. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631 
(1985). 
 408. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974). 
 409. 143 CONG. REC. E1438-01 (1997). 
 410. Id. 
 411. Id. 
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business in the nation.”412  Furthermore, if Congress violates treaties or 
fails to fulfill international obligations, “the Nation will be none the less 
exposed to all the international consequences of such a violation . . . .”413  
Under Article III of the Convention, the United States has a duty to 
“recognize arbitral awards as binding.”414
 
  Allowing state arbitration 
statutes to reverse-preempt the Convention and stymie arbitration among 
international insurers would prevent the United States from satisfying 
this international obligation.  Failing to enforce and recognize arbitral 
awards among international insurers may eventually lead to backlash 
from other countries, which may disadvantage and overturn the 
investment expectations of American businesses. 
CONCLUSION 
As the MFA continues to provide states with a tool to invalidate 
arbitration agreements in international insurance contracts, commercial 
parties’ expectations and relations in the industry remain in jeopardy.  
To adequately protect the interests of both states and commercial parties, 
Congress and the Supreme Court should resolve the split in authority by 
recognizing that the MFA does not enable anti-arbitration state laws to 
reverse-preempt the Convention and invalidate mutually-agreed upon 
arbitration clauses.  This resolution would effectively prevent states 
from thwarting commercial parties’ expectations as embodied in their 
arbitration agreements under the guise of regulating the insurance 
industry.  Upholding international parties’ arbitration agreements under 
the Convention would also comport with the United States’ duty to 
fulfill its international obligations and its overall national policy 
favoring arbitration as an effective dispute resolution mechanism. 
 
 
 412. Id. 
 413. See HENKIN, supra note 364 at 222 (citing Memorandum for President Harding, 
October 8, 1921, Sec’y of State Charles Evans Hughes, 5 Hackworth at 324-25). 
 414. New York Convention, supra note 5, art. III. 
